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CYBERSECURITY, IDENTITY THEFT, AND STANDING LAW: A
FRAMEWORK FOR DATA BREACHES USING SUBSTANTIAL RISK IN A
POST-CLAPPER WORLD

A man who is used to acting in one way never changes; he must come to
ruin when the times, in changing, no longer are in harmony with his ways.
~Niccolò Machiavelli, THE PRINCE

JAMES C. CHOU*

INTRODUCTION

Large-scale cyberattacks1 involving the theft of personal and confidential
records continue to make headlines as cybersecurity evolves into a national
issue.2 In 2015 alone, there were over 2,000 cases of data breaches with
known data loss across a range of institutions.3 Many data breaches, such as
* Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 66. J.D. Candidate, 2018
American University Washington College of Law; M.S., George Mason University, 2008; B.A.,
University of Virginia, 2005. Articles Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 66.
My sincere thanks to Professor Jennifer Daskal for her wisdom and guidance, and the National
Security Law Brief staff for their meticulous efforts and assistance in refining this Article.
Above all, a sincere thanks to my parents, Jaw and My Duc, and to Carrie Zheng for their
unwavering support
1 “A [cybersecurity] incident is a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security
policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” PAUL CICHONSKI ET AL., NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-61, REVISION 2,
(DRAFT), COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT HANDLING GUIDE 6 (2012). An incident can lead to
web-service disruption, malware infection, and sensitive-data exposure.
2 See President Barack Obama, Statement on Cybersecurity Framework (Feb. 12, 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/12/statement-presidentcybersecurity-framework (“America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our individual
liberties depend on our commitment to securing cyberspace”); see generally EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE (2011).
3 VERIZON, 2015 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3 (2015) [hereinafter DBIR 2015].
For a list of major breaches involving national security or sensitive information, see David
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those involving the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Ashley
Madison, have implicated more than just financial or identify-theft concerns,
they have also raised national security issues and exposed victims to potential
blackmail.4
As the cyber threat evolves, there is more data suggesting that databreach victims are at a heightened risk of becoming subsequent victims for
identity theft and other related crimes.5 In 2012, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics estimated that identity theft affected 16.6 million people and
inflicted financial losses totaling $24.7 billion, which is $10 billion more than
burglary, vehicle theft, and general theft combined.6 Furthermore, estimates
for 2014 increased, with an estimated 17.6 million victims totaling near $15.4
billion.7 More importantly, while forensic analysis of some data breaches
suggest a zero-day or complex attack that is hard to prevent, many highprofile breaches could have been prevented through simple controls and
safeguards.8

Inserra and Paul Rosenzweig, Continuing Federal Cyber Breaches Warn Against Cybersecurity
Regulation, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 27, 2014),
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/10/continuing-federal-cyber-breaches-warn-againstcybersecurity-regulation.
4 See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
5 See Susan Ladika, Study: Data Breaches Pose a Greater Risk, CREDITCARDS.COM (Jul. 23, 2014),
http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/data-breach-id-theft-risk-increase-study1282.php (noting that the chances of being victimized after data loss have increased from onein-nine in 2010 to one-in-three in 2014); see also Eva Velasquez, Study Shows Link Between Breaches
and Fraud, IDT911 (Jun. 10, 2010), http://idt911.com/education/blog/study-shows-linkbetween-breaches-and-fraud (noting the Identity Theft Resource Center’s findings that data
breach victims experience an eightfold increase of “existing [credit] card fraud” risk).
6 ERIKA HARRELL & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2012 6 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit12.pdf.
7 ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF
IDENTITY THEFT, 2014 6-7 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf.
8 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. A zero-day attack generally involves exploiting a
vulnerability that a software developer (and the broader community) is not yet aware of. Kim
Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is A Zero-Day? WIRED (Nov. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero-day/. Zero-day attacks are harder to defend
against because there is no known patch or fix for the vulnerability. However, most data
breaches involving consumer data are not in this category. See DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 15
(finding that most vulnerabilities were known at the time a breach occurred). Plus, there are
also established methods that corporations can use to “harden” their systems against zero-day
attacks. See generally LINGYU WANG ET AL., K-ZERO DAY SAFETY: A NETWORK SECURITY
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Since Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,9 many courts have shut the
door on victims alleging a heightened risk of injury, particularly when the
injury is identity theft, because Clapper does not permit standing based on a
heightened risk of injury alone.10 But recently, the Seventh Circuit disagreed
with that view when deciding Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group,11 a case
involving a breach of Neiman Marcus’ systems, holding that Clapper neither
altered standing law nor did it foreclose all heightened risk injuries.12 This
Article agrees and argues that Clapper did not alter the Article III standing
requirements; it merely reemphasized the Court’s demand for a heightened
scrutiny for constitutional challenges to government activity. Consequently,
the Seventh Circuit correctly applied standing law in Remijas under a
“substantial” risk theory.
Part I will discuss large-scale data breaches and its relationship with
identity theft, Clapper, and Article III standing on imminent injuries. Part II
argues that the minimum constitutional threshold should allow standing
under a heightened-risk-of-identity-theft (HRIT) using a “substantial” or
“reasonable” risk threshold. Part III applies Part II to data-breach cases,
specifically, and suggests several factors the courts could consider when
determining whether a victim faces a sufficiently imminent injury for Article
III standing. Part III also demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit used similar
factors in Remijas. I then conclude.

METRIC FOR MEASURING THE SECURITY RISK OF NETWORKS AGAINST UNKNOWN ATTACKS
10-13 (2013), http://csrc.nist.gov/staff/Singhal/ieee_tdsc_2013_final_version.pdf.
9 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S.A., 133 S. Ct. 1134 (2013).
10 See Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.’ Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“Clapper has
resolved the circuit split.”); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365 (M.D. Pa. 2015)
(“Allegations of increased risk of identity theft are insufficient to allege a harm.”).
11 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
12 Id. at 693-94.
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BACKGROUND

A. Data Breaches and Lawsuits

The struggle for adequate cybersecurity continues as society further
incorporates Internet and digital technology in all aspects of life.13 A critical
cybersecurity tenant is protecting sensitive personally identifiable information
(PII) and online accounts, which includes names, addresses, social-security
numbers (SSNs), financial data, consumer habits, passwords, medical records,
and other information that can be used to further fraud and identity theft.14
PII is becoming an extremely valuable commodity for criminals, foreign
intelligence operatives, and independent actors within the digital age, who
often utilize PII to commit fraud or espionage.15 Massive black-markets have
been established within the deep web to sell and purchase PII.16 More

See KASEY LOGAUGH, DELOITTE, THE NEW DIGITAL DIVIDE 5 (2014),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-business/us-rdthenewdigitaldivide-041814.pdf (noting that digital sales were estimated at $1.1 trillion in 2013
and “projected to grow to $1.5 trillion by the end of 2014”).
14 See GARY STONEBURNER, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
SPECIAL PUB. 800-33, UNDERLYING TECHNICAL MODELS FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
SECURITY, 2-5 (2001) (noting that “confidentiality,” “availability,” and “integrity” are the three
main objectives for information security). “Confidentiality” is about securing “private”
information from unauthorized access. Confidentiality is often prioritized “behind availability
and integrity.” See also 44 U.S.C. § 3542(B)(1)(B) (2015) (defining confidentiality); see also ERICA
in Federal information policy); ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF SCISTANDARDS &
TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-122, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII), ES-1-2 (2010)
(discussing various forms of PII).
15 See Graham Messick and Maria Gavrilovic, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal
Information (60 Minutes Mar. 9,2014) (transcript available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information/) (noting
that a complete set of identity information for health-insurance fraud could fetch hundreds of
dollars on the black market); see also Tim Greene, Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10X
Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers, NETWORK WORLD (Feb 6. 2015, 5:49 AM),
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2880366/security0/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolensells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html (noting that social security numbers,
birth dates, and other personal information are more valuable than credit card accounts
because they are reusable).
16 See Namaan Huq, Follow the Data: Dissecting Data Breaches and Debunking Myths, TREND MICRO
22-35 (2015), https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security13

124

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 7, No. 1

interestingly, some organizations have even legally monetized PII by
developing digital platforms enabling consumers to, effectively, sell their
personal information (in the form of habits, preferences, and interests) for
compensation.17
There were many interesting data-breach incidents in 2014-2015,
particularly Ashley Madison, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the
healthcare sector, and retailers. These cases represent the expanding creativity
and motivational spectrum that cyber-criminals have, who are expanding the
range of financial and nonfinancial damages victims sustained.
In late 2015, a hacking group stole PII and user accounts from
AshleyMadison.com18 with the intention of forcing the site to shut down.19
After “completely compromising the company’s user databases,” the attackers
released an ultimatum:
We have taken over all systems in your entire
office and production domains, all customer
information

databases,

repositories,

financial

source
records,

code
emails.

Shutting down [Ashley Madison] and EM
will cost you, but non-compliance will cost
you more: [w]e will release all customer
records, profiles with all the customer’s
secret sexual fantasies, nude pictures, and

intelligence/white-papers/wp-follow-the-data.pdf (showing screenshots of various prices for
different types of PII, financial records, and online accounts).
17 See Ben Woods, What’s the True Value of Your Personal Data? Meet the People Who Want to Help
You Sell it, INSIDER (Sep. 17, 2013), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2013/09/17/whats-thetrue-value-of-your-personal-data-meet-the-people-who-want-to-help-you-sell-it/ (discussing
Handshake as a new platform where users can volunteer identifiable or anonymous personal
information to businesses, earning $1,600 to $8,000).
18 Brian Krebs, Online Cheating Site Ashley Madison Hacked, KREBSON SECURITY (Jul. 19, 2015,
11:40 PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/07/online-cheating-site-ashleymadison-hacked/.
19 The Ashley Madison Hack . . . in 2 Minutes, CNN (Sep. 11, 2015, 11:34 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/24/technology/ashley-madison-hack-in-2minutes/index.html.
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conversations and matching credit card
transactions, real names and addresses, and
employee documents and emails.20
When Avid Life Media, Ashley Madison’s owner, failed to comply, the
hackers released PII records of more than thirty-seven million members.21
After the release, there were numerous repercussions, including the
resignation of Avid Life Media’s CEO, increased opportunities for extortion,
and widespread public humiliation.22 John Gibson, an Ashley Madison user
and a pastor, committed suicide after the records release and left his wife and
kids behind.23
A few months prior, OPM reported a massive breach of its personnel
systems, including 19.7 million personnel records through its clearanceadjudication system, e-QIP.24 The breach occurred sometime around March
2014 and OPM discovered the breach four months later.25 The e-QIP system
contained a “treasure trove” of information related to previous crimes,
psychological problems, and sexual history.26 It also included approximately
5.6 million fingerprint records.27 Many cybersecurity and intelligence analysts

Krebs, supra note 18.
Alyssa Newcomb, Ashley Madison Hack: What’s Included in the Data Dump, ABC NEWS (Aug.
19, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ashley-madison-hack-included-datadump/story?id=33176238.
22 David Bisson, The Ashley Madison Hack – A Timeline, TRIPWIRE,
http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/the-ashleymadison-hack-a-timeline/ (last updated Sep. 10, 2015); see Kristen V. Brown, We Talked to 24
Victims of the Ashley Madison Hack About Their Exposed Secrets, FUSION (Aug. 19, 2015, 7:06 PM),
http://fusion.net/story/185647/ashley-madison-hack-victims/ (“The thing about this leak is
that it’s a public shaming.”).
23 See Laurie Segall, Pastor Outed on Ashley Madison Commits Suicide, CNN (Sep. 8, 2015, 7:10 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/08/technology/ashley-madison-suicide/index.html.
24 See Brian Krebs, Catching Up on the OPM Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jun. 15, 2015, 11:25
AM). https://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/06/catching-up-on-the-opm-breach/.
25 See id.
26 Id. (quoting Ellen Nakashima & Lisa Rein, Chinese Hackers Go After U.S. Workers’ Personal
Data, WASH. POST (Jul. 10, 2014) (characterizing the amount of information stolen as a
“treasure trove”); Kim Zetter & Andy Greenburg, Why the OPM Breach is Such a Security and
Privacy Debacle, WIRED (Jun. 11 2015, 10:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/opmbreach-security-privacy-debacle/.
27 See Andrea Peterson, OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as Many
as Previously Thought, WASH. POST (Sep. 23, 2015),
20
21
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have emphasized national-security implications with current and formal
federal employees being potentially exposed to blackmail, identity theft, and
counter-intelligence and collection activities.28 Furthermore, many federal
employees have expanded their frustration and anger about the government’s
failure to protect their PII.29
In another turn of events, the healthcare and health insurance sectors
faced a record number of successful attacks with millions of medical records
stolen over the past several years, imposing over six billion in costs.30
Interestingly, healthcare records are becoming increasingly valuable to
cybercriminals because, unlike credit-card numbers, “medical and prescription
records are permanent.”31 Healthcare records also provide a complete
profile,32 which allows a greater range of exploitation options, such as

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-morethan-five-million-fingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/.
28 See Zetter & Greenburg, supra note 26 (discussing how foreign intelligence agents could use
the information obtained from background checks to blackmail current intelligence employees
who have access to highly classified information). What makes the OPM breach worse is that
security clearance applicants must often disclose sensitive PII of relatives, family members, and
friends. See Josephine Wolff, The OPM Breach Is Putting A Damper on My Thanksgiving, SLATE
(Nov. 24, 2015, 12:52 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/11/the_opm_data_breach_is_
putting_a_damper_on_my_thanksgiving.html (“I’ll . . . tell my family members that they may
be at risk and there’s nothing I can do about it.”).
29 See Wolff, supra note 28; see also John Schindler, Ex-NSA Officer: OPM Hack is Serious Breach of
Trust, NPR (Jun. 13, 2015, :50 8:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/06/13/414149626/exnsa-officer-opm-hack-is-serious-breach-of-worker-trust (discussing how the leak will create
more vulnerable government employees, and the feeling of “betrayal” with the government’s
failure to protect information).
30 See Dan Munro, Data Breaches In Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million Records In 2015, FORBES
(Dec. 15 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/databreaches-in-healthcare-total-over-112-million-records-in-2015/ (noting there were more than
253 healthcare breaches in 2015 with a combined total of over 112 million medical records
stolen, approximately one-in-three Americans); see also Shannon Pettypiece, Rising Cyber Attacks
Costing Health System $6 Billion Annually, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2015, 6:00 AM)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-07/rising-cyber-attacks-costing-healthsystem-6-billion-annually (noting that hospitals are losing $2.1 million, on average, from
insurance fraud).
31 Fahmida Y. Rashid, Why Hackers Want Your Health Care Data Most of All, INFOWORLD (Sep.
14, 2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2983634/security/why-hackers-want-yourhealth-care-data-breaches-most-of-all.html.
32 See INST. FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TECH., HACKING HEALTHCARE IT IN 2016 5-6
(2016), http://icitech.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ICIT-Brief-Hacking-Healthcare-ITin-2016.pdf [hereinafter ICIT REPORT] (noting that hackers will “expend significant resources”
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“obtain[ing] prescription medicine [using] the victim’s identity.”33 Many
victims of health-related fraud experience critical issues, such as “lifethreatening inaccuracies in their medical records,” “misdiagnosis,” and
inaccurate prescriptions.34 In 2013, consumers paid nearly twelve-billion
dollars of out-of-pocket costs.35
Classic attacks on retailers and the financial sector using point-of-sale
(POS) attacks or credit-card skimmers have not substantially abated.36 In
2013, Target and Neiman Marcus faced similar sophisticated attacks on their
systems.37 And though the Neiman Marcus attack was smaller, it was more
sophisticated, resulting in more than 9,000 credit cards being fraudulently
used.38
A common theme for many cybersecurity incidents is that they were
preventable had sound security measures and practices been in place prior to

to find and obtain healthcare records because hospitals have more private information on and
individual than any bank or employer).
33 See Brian Krebs, A Day in the Life of a Stolen Healthcare Record, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 28,
2015, 12:46 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/04/a-day-in-the-life-of-a-stolenhealthcare-record/ [hereinafter Krebs on Healthcare] (tying tax return fraud reported by
physicians to data breaches in the healthcare sector).
34 Medical ID Fraud Costs Consumers $12bn in Out-of-Pocket Costs, INFO SECURITY (Sep, 16 2013),
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/medical-id-fraud-costs-consumers-12bn-in-outof/.
35 See id.; see also BARBARA FILKINS, SANS INST., HEALTH CARE CYBERTHREAT REPORT 5 (2014)
(emphasizing that unlike credit-card fraud, consumers generally cannot recover costs for
health-care-related fraud).
36 See DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 35-38 (discussing trends in POS and credit-card skimming
exploits). POS and credit-card skimming are specific exploits designed to capture credit-card
numbers and other financial data at the when the vendor or customer swipes a credit card.
SYMANTEC, SPECIAL REPORT: ATTACKS ON POINT-OF-SALE SYSTEMS, V.2.0 5 (2014). Credit
card systems handle a variety of transactions today, and although all vendors are required to
comply with PCI-DSS, a security standard, there are vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
attacking associated networks. Id. at 6-7.
37 See Rip Empson, Neiman Marcus Breach Could Be Part Of Larger Holiday Cyberattack On U.S.
Retailers, TECHCRUNCH (Jan 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/11/following-attackon-target-neiman-marcus-confirms-its-own-breach-and-could-be-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg/;
see also Victoria Wagner Ross, Target Cyber Breach Extends, Neiman Marcus Reports a Cyber-Theft,
EXAMINER (Jan 11, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/target-cyber-breachextends-neiman-marcus-reports-a-cyber-theft-attack.
38 Benjamin Elgin et al., Neiman Marcus Hackers Set off 60,000 Alerts with Card Thefts,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0221/neiman-marcus-hackers-set-off-60-000-alerts-in-bagging-card-data.html.
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(and during) an attack.39 Many companies, organizations, and agencies are
often criticized for mishandling large-scale breaches and for failing to
implement an effective cybersecurity program.40 For instance, OPM failed to
encrypt PII information in the system, which is an “industry best practice.”41
Target also missed many warning signs that, if acted on, could have prevented
the breach from becoming a serious problem.42 Often, warnings do not help.
In 2014, the FBI warned the healthcare industry that its systems were
vulnerable to cyberattacks, but hackers, nevertheless, made several dozen
successful attacks.43 Another trend is that companies, especially healthcare
providers, have access to greater and greater amounts of data.44
Consequently, a single compromise has greater effects.
Even worse, most companies do little to mitigate vulnerability risks or
make substantial security investments pre- and post-attack.45 This is partially

See U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, TA15-119, TOP 30 TARGETED HIGH RISK
VULNERABILITIES (2015), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-119A [hereinafter USCERT] (finding that “[eighty-five] percent of targeted attacks are preventable”).
40 See DBIR 2015, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that 99.9% of breaches involving a vulnerability
exploit “were compromised more than a year after the [Common Vulnerability & Exposure
(CVE)] was published”). See generally COMMON VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURES,
http://cve.mitre.org/about/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016), (A CVE “is a list of
information security vulnerabilities and exposures that aims to provide common names for
publicly known cybersecurity issues.). See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OPM U.S.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, SEMI ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 7-11 (2015) (noting
several security gaps among healthcare providers under an OPM administrated health
program).
41 David Perera, Agency Didn't Encrypt Feds' Data Hacked by Chinese, POLITICO (last updated Jun.
5, 2015, 9:03PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/personal-data-of-4-millionfederal-employees-hacked-118655.
42 See A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT FOR
CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER i (Mar. 26, 2014).
43 See Jim Finkle, FBI Warns Healthcare Sector Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks, REUTERS (Apr. 23 2014,
3:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-healthcare-fbi-exclusividUSBREA3M1Q920140423; see also Munro, supra note 30 (listing the top ten healthcare data
breaches in 2015); see generally FILKINS, supra note 35, at 4-5, 7-11 (analyzing malicious traffic
patterns and concluding there is massive security non-compliance and vulnerabilities across the
healthcare sector).
44 See FILKINS, supra note 35, at 12.
45 See US-CERT, supra note 39; see also J. Craig Anderson, Identity Theft Growing, Costly to Victims,
USA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2013, 4:38 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/04/14/identity-theftgrowing/2082179/ (noting that corporations are not investing in security and that law
enforcement finds it difficult to investigate, leaving victims to fend for themselves).
39
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because most companies or agencies are not sustaining any major financial
loss from data breaches:46 the majority of the risk is borne by the consumer
and credit-card issuers.47 Furthermore, many suggest that current legislative
proposals would not fix the problem.48 And though the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has taken affirmative steps to impose additional costs on
companies that disregard modern-day security practices, there is still a
substantial cost-to-risk imbalance.49

See Erik Sherman, The Reason Companies Don’t Fix Cybersecurity, CBS NEWS (Mar. 15, 2015,
5:30 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-reason-companies-dont-fix-cybersecurity/
(arguing that companies do not absorb any substantial financial damages and that the majority
of the damage is, instead, absorbed by the economy); see also Benjamin Deen, Why Companies
Have Little Incentive to Invest in Cybersecurity, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 4, 2015, 2:26 PM) (noting
that target’s total losses were only $105 million, approximately 0.1% of 2014 sales); DBIR 2015,
supra note 3, at 63 (noting that “time to market” for software development is critical and is
prioritized over security concerns); William Roberds & Stacey L. Schreft, Data Breaches and
Identity Theft, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA 24-31 (Sep. 2008) (Working Paper No. 2008-22),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296131 (suggesting, through modeling,
a steady-state imbalance between corporate liability and the cost of identity theft).
47 See Robin Sidel, Cost of Credit-Card Fraud Is Set to Shift, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 29, 2015, 6:59 PM)
(noting that, historically, credit-card issuers covered fraudulent transactions).
48 See, e.g., DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 26 (cautioning that information-sharing is “less than
optimal” and that understanding the “true effects” of proposed legislation is essential); see also
Benjamin Dean, Sorry Consumers, Companies Have Little Incentive to Invest in Better Cybersecurity,
QUARTZ (Mar. 05, 2015), http://qz.com/356274/cybersecurity-breaches-hurt-consumerscompanies-not-so-much/ (suggesting that governments may prioritize intelligence gathering
over data security, creating incentives to maintain vulnerabilities).
49 See generally Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcing Privacy Promises,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcingprivacy-promises (listing FTC enforcement actions). After a data breach occurs, many
companies will offer credit monitoring and identity theft protection services to those affected
for a specified period. Jamie White, Retailers Offer Free Credit Monitoring, ID Theft Protection,
LIFELOCK (Jan. 30, 2014). https://www.lifelock.com/education/retailers-offering-free-creditmonitoring-id-theft-protection/. But these victims are often re-victimized by these very creditmonitoring services, who disregard basic safeguards for data security. See Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Lifelock to Pay $100 million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges it Violated
2010 Order (Dec. 17, 2015) (noting that Lifelock failed to meet basic security standards by
establishing and maintaining an information security plan). Ironically, Lifelock was given the
contract to monitor OPM data breach victims. Jennifer van der Kleut, White House Awards
Contract for Identity Theft Protection for Millions of Victims of OPM Data Breach, LIFELOCK (Sep. 4,
2015).
46
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B. Standing and HRIT pre-Clapper

Data-breach victims alleging a HRIT have historically faced various
standing thresholds, with modern standing inquiry arguably being more
stringent on imminent injuries. Prior to Clapper, the circuits split on whether
HRIT was a sufficiently imminent injury for standing purposes, with the
Ninth and Seventh Circuits saying yes and the Third Circuit saying no.50 In
doing so, The Ninth and Seventh Circuits used more lenient thresholds, while
the Third Circuit required that imminent injuries be “certainly impending.”51
1. Modern standing law and imminent injuries
Article III limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and
“controversies.”52 This constitutional floor to jurisdiction has been described
as standing law.53 However, the requirements for constitutional standing have
expanded and contracted over time.54 Historically, standing law required a
plaintiff to have, at the very least, a “personal stake in the outcome of the

See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.B.2.
52 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). The Constitution limits courts
to the exercise of “strictly judicial” powers. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 355-57
(1911) (noting that the judicial power “implies the existence of present or possible adverse
parties, whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication”) (quoting In re Pac. Ry.
Comm’n, 32 Fed. 241, 255).
53 See Lujan, supra note 53, at 560 (noting that the standing requirement exists partially because
the court’s jurisdiction is constitutionally limited to “cases” and “controversies”). The Court
acknowledges that the “cases” and “controversies” requirement, as articulated through
standing law, is vague, so the Court often compares prior case law with a current case-inquestion. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (“the standing inquiry requires
careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations.”). There are, however, general
guidelines in many cases. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377, 1386 (2014) (holding that Article III standing generally precludes third-party lawsuits,
lawsuits raising generalized issues that are better resolved by other branches, and lawsuits that
fall outside the “zone-of-interests” under the particular law it seeks relief from).
54 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (acknowledging that the Court does
not have a consistent and complete definition for Article III standing); Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams.’ United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (noting
vagueness in “whether particular features [of standing are] required by Art[icle] III ex proprio
vigore, or whether” they are self-imposed).
50
51
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controversy.”55 But after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 56 the modern
“irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing is more stringent;57 a
plaintiff must demonstrate an (1) “injury-in-fact”58 that is (2) “fairly . . .
trace[able]” to the defendant’s actions59 and (3) is likely to be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”60 Lujan also holds that the “injury-in-fact” must be
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ’conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical’”61
Contemporary standing law has tied its Article III purposes to the
separation-of-powers; to this extent, standing prevents the courts from
encroaching on the political branches.62 A deeply rooted implication of
separation-of-powers doctrine and standing law is that Article III prohibits
advisory opinions.63 There are also prudential reasons for standing law.64

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181
(1974) (Powell, J. concurring) (reemphasizing the requirement for “a personal stake” as the
“controlling definition” for constitutional standing).
56 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
57 Id. at 560.
58 Id. The three-pronged test solidified from the Court’s opinion in Allen, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984) (holding that personal injury, traceability, and redressability are the core constitutional
components of standing), which borrowed from Valley Forge Christian Coll., supra note 55, at 472
(holding that an “actual or threatened injury,” traceability, and redressability is an “irreducible
minimum”).
59 Lujan, supra note 53, at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41-42 (1976)).
60 Id. at 560 (quoting Simon, supra note 60, at 38).
61 Id. (quoting Whitmore, supra note 55, at 155).
62 See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 (2015)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (discussing separation-of-powers and standing law); see also Muskrat, supra
note 53, at 352-56 (1911) (discussing various holdings emphasizing that federal-court
jurisdiction is limited to ‘cases’ by the Constitution and cannot be expanded by the legislature);
see also Allen, supra note 54, at 752 (1984) (“[S]tanding is built on a single basic idea – the idea of
separation of powers.”); F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 55, 85-86
(2012) [hereinafter Probabilistic Standing] (noting that “separation-of-powers . . . has significantly
influenced standing doctrine”). The Lujan standing requirements incorporate both Article III
and separation-of-powers concerns. Lexmark, supra note 54, at 1386.
63 See Muskrat, supra note 53, at 357-58 (acknowledging that Marbury v. Madison precludes
advisory opinions).
64 See Lexmark, supra note 54, at 1386 (noting “prudential,” non-Article III standing generally
bars third-party lawsuits, lawsuits raising generalized issues that are better resolved by other
branches, and lawsuits falling outside the “zone-of-interests” under the particular law it seeks
relief from); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., supra note 55, at 473-75 (1982) (noting
“prudential principles” where plaintiffs must “generally assert [their] own legal rights and
interests” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
55
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Although Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury, it need
not have already occurred; an imminent or threatened injury is sufficient.65
But “fear-based” and heightened-risk cases are an emerging field post-Lujan’s
imminent-injury requirements.66 Because this area creates situations where an
alleged injury may not occur, some courts are reluctant to find standing.67
Yet, all courts have made exceptions for sufficiently imminent injuries,
reasoning that “plaintiffs should not have to wait for an injury to occur before
seeking a remedy.”68 But the circuits have split over how “imminent” an injury
should be to satisfy Article III standing requirements.69
2. Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly, the three Pre-Clapper HRIT circuit cases
Prior to Clapper, there were three similar circuit cases involving HRIT:
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits found standing for data-breach victims in
both Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp70 and Krottner v. Starbucks,71 while the

727, 731-32 (1972) (requiring that the Plaintiff have a “personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy,” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
65 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (holding that a plaintiff has a sufficient
injury when she demonstrates that she is “immediately in danger of” a direct injury from a
statutes’ operation).
66 See generally Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1445, 1447-51, 1464-72 (2011) (noting that heightened risk or “anticipatory harm”
is a subset of fear-based injury).
67 See Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 61-65 (acknowledging the Court’s concerns about
expanding its powers under imminent injuries but pointing out that the courts have
traditionally “exercise[ed] jurisdiction over claims for prospective relief.”); see also Diana R. H.
Winters, False Certainty: Judicial Forcing of the Quantification of Risk, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 315, 337
(2013) (noting the D.C. Circuit’s concerns about expanding the courts’ role by allowing
“increased-risk claims” (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Traffic Highway Safety Admin., 489
F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007))).
68 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343 (2014) (holding that plaintiffs
facing a “credible threat” need not wait for “prosecution” before “seeking relief” (quoting
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15 (2010)).
69 See, e.g., Winters, supra note 67, at 335-46 (comparing the Second Circuit’s and D.C. Circuit’s
standards for imminent injuries). The Supreme Court recognizes that imminence is a
“somewhat elastic concept.” Clapper, supra note 10, at 1147 (quoting Lujan, supra note 53, at
565 n.2).
70 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
71 638 F.3d. 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Third Circuit denied standing in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.72 Whether a HRIT was
sufficiently imminent for standing depended on the different thresholds each
circuit applied.
Pisciotta, decided in 2007, was the first Seventh Circuit case discussing
whether a HRIT is a sufficiently imminent injury; although the Seventh
Circuit held that the Plaintiffs did have Article III standing, it nonetheless
concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to state any “compensable injury” under
Indiana law.73 Old National Bancorp’s (ONB’s) servers were breached by an
external actor, who stole bank-applicant information, including “name[s],
address[es], [SSNs], driver’s license number[s], [birthdays], mother’s maiden
name[s], and credit card” numbers.74 The court found that the “intrusion was
sophisticated, intentional, and malicious.”75 And ONB notified its customers
of the breach.76 After obtaining credit-monitoring services to protect
themselves, ONB’s customers sued in district court, alleging ONB was
negligent and breached their contract.77 The district court dismissed for lack
of a cognizable injury under Indiana law because none of the Plaintiffs could
show instances of financial loss or identity theft.78
The Seventh Circuit reversed on the standing issue, but it affirmed the
district court’s holding that Indiana law would not permit credit-monitoring
services as a compensable injury.79 The Seventh Circuit held that “the injuryin-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act
which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm that the

664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 633-35, 640.
74 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 631-32.
75 Id. at 632.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 633-34 (noting that the district court “relied on several cases from other district courts .
. . conclud[ing] that the federal courts lack jurisdiction because plaintiffs whose data has been
compromised, but not yet misused, have not suffered an injury-in-fact . . .”).
79 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 633-34.
72
73
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plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”80
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs’ HRIT met
the constitutional burden.81
Similarly, Krottner, decided in 2010, was the Ninth Circuit’s first
opportunity to consider the same issue, and the Ninth Circuit, borrowing
from Pisciotta, held that the Plaintiffs had stated a sufficiently imminent
injury.82 This case did not involve a malicious hacker; rather, it involved an
opportunist who stole a Starbucks laptop containing “unencrypted names,
addresses, and social security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks
employees.”83 Starbucks notified its employees of the theft and provided free
credit monitoring for all affected employees for a fixed term.84 Several
employees sued Starbucks, alleging negligence and breach of contract for the
loss of their PII.85 Although the district court held that the employees had
alleged a sufficiently imminent injury, it dismissed for a lack of a “cognizable
injury under Washington law.”86 The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that a
See id. at 634, 638-39 (comparing HRIT with other types of heightened-risk cases, such as
medical monitoring and toxic tort liability, where courts have found a sufficiently imminent
injury. The similarity between other types of heightened-risk cases and data-breach cases has
been extensively argued as a basis for granting standing); Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity
Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal
Information, 62 AM. L. REV. 1365, 1387-96 (2013) (arguing that data- breach cases are
“analogous” to classic-tort cases involving imminent harm from toxic exposure, defective
medical devices, and environmental damage); but see Reilly, supra note 73, at 44-46
(distinguishing toxic exposure, defective-medical device, and environmental damage cases
because they often involve human health (as opposed to economic) and cannot often be
resolved entirely through “monetary compensation”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,
998 F. Supp.2d 646, 656 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (distinguishing medical monitoring cases).
81 Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 633-34.
82 Krottner, supra note 72, at 1142-43.
83 Id. at 1140.
84 Id. at 1140-41.
85 Id. at 1141.
86 Id. at 1141. The Plaintiffs in Krottner ran into the same problem as Pisciotta because they did
not allege a cognizable injury under state law. See Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 639-40 (“Plaintiffs
have not come forward with a single case or statute [allowing credit monitoring costs] from any
jurisdiction, authorizing the kind of action they now ask . . . to recognize . . . under Indiana
law”); Krottner, supra note 72, at 131 (“Under Washington law, ‘[a]ctual loss or damage is an
essential element . . . [and] [t]he mere danger of future harm . . . will not support a negligence
action.’” (quoting Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975) (en banc)); but
see Lone Star Nat’l Bank v. Heartland Payment Sys., 729 F.3d 421, 423, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar recovery in tort under New Jersey law
80
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HRIT is a sufficient injury for standing because a “threatened injury
constitutes injury in fact.”87
In contrast, the Third Circuit decided, in Reilly, that a HRIT alone was
too “speculative” to be a sufficient injury.88 Like ONB, “Ceridian’s Powerpay
system” was breached, giving the attacker access to “first name[s], last
name[s], social security number[s] . . . birth dates[s] and/or … bank account
[information].”89 The victims sued Ceridian for “an increased risk of identity
theft,” relying on Pisciotta’s and Krottner’s holdings.90 However, the district
court held that HRIT, alone, was insufficient injury for standing purposes;
and even if it was, the Plaintiffs still had no cognizable injury under state
law.91
The Third Circuit affirmed on appeal, holding that the Constitution
requires an imminent injury be “certainly impending,” and a HRIT is a
“possible future injury” that is “too speculative” to be “certainly
impending.”92 Furthermore, the Third Circuit found that the Plaintiffs’ injury
rested on a series of “ifs,” making the claim “attenuated.”93 Also, the Third
Circuit held that an injury is unlikely to be “certainly impending” when it rests

when the Defendant could reasonably foresee that card issuers would be injured by its failure
to secure payment-card transactions).
87 Krottner, supra note 72, at 1142.
88 Reilly, supra note 73, at 46. Clapper seems to borrow heavily from Reilly’s reasoning since they
both apply the “certainly impending” standard. Both rest heavily on Whitmore v. Arkansas. See
infra Part I.E.1.
89 Reilly, supra note 73, at 40.
90 Id. at 40, 44.
91 Id. at 40-41.
92 Id. at 42-43 (quoting Whitmore, supra note 55, at 158).
93 See Reilly, supra note 73, at 43 (“we cannot now describe how Appellants will be injured .in
this case .without beginning our explanation with the word ‘if’: if the hacker read, copied, and
understood the hacked information...and if the hacker attempts to use the information, and if
he does so successfully, . . .only then will Appellants have suffered an injury.”). For the “if
test,” the Third Circuit cited, Storino v. Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2003). In
Storino the owners of a “rooming house” in the Point Pleasant Boroughs challenged the
constitutionality of a recently passed zoning ordinance that prohibited “rooming/boarding”
use. Despite acknowledging that New Jersey provides “vested” properties with the right to
continuing “non-conforming” uses, the owners argued that the ordinance would eventually
harm them because it would deprive them of their current uses. Id. at 297. The court held that
the alleged injury was “conjectural” because it required an “if” condition. Id. at 297-98.
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on “future actions of an unknown third-party.”94 Specifically, the Third
Circuit held that the hacker’s intent was unknowable, so the Plaintiffs in Reilly
fell even shorter than Lujan’s Plaintiffs.95
The Third Circuit also distinguished both Pisciotta and Knotter, noting that
both cases considered more “immediate” risks and that both cases simply
analogized and did not discuss the constitutional threshold for imminent
injuries.96 As the Third Circuit noted, it was undisputed in Pisciotta that the
hack was “sophisticated, intentional, malicious,”97 also there were already
identity theft attempts in Krottner.98 Furthermore, the Third Circuit rejected
the defective medical device and toxic exposure analogies advanced by both
cases because, unlike identity theft, those harms “had undoubtedly
occurred.”99 Moreover, environmental-damage cases could not always be
resolved by monetary compensation.100 Ultimately, the Third Circuit
concluded that Pisciotta and Krottner did not follow the “certainly impending”
standard for imminent injuries and, thus, were not persuasive.101
C. Four standards for imminent injury and two from the Clapper majority
The Supreme Court introduced several thresholds for imminence.102
Clapper, the most recent case, introduced four distinct thresholds for how

See Reilly, supra note 73, at 42 (observing that the Plaintiffs in Lujan had “control” over
whether the injury was sufficiently “imminent” because “all [they] needed to do was [state an
intention to] travel to the site”).
95 See id. at 42 (concluding that Plaintiffs’ injury was “even more speculative than those . . . in
Lujan”).
96 See id. at 43-44 (noting that the Pisciotta court did not discuss the “certainly impending”
threshold and how it relates to data-breach cases).
97 Id. at 43-44 (quoting Pisciotta, supra note 71, at 632.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 44-46 (noting that the victims in toxic-exposure cases have the immediate concern
of preventing further harm to their health).
100 Id. at 44-45.
101 See id. at 44 (describing Krottner’s and Pisciotta’s rationale as “skimpy”).
102 See Andrew C. Sand, Note, Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard for FearBased Injury in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 MICH. L. REV. 711, 712-15, 726-33
(2015) (arguing that Clapper created three separately different standards for injury-in-fact).
94
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imminent an injury must be. Specifically, the Court rejected the Second
Circuit’s “objective reasonable likelihood” threshold,103 reemphasized the
“certainly impending” threshold,104 and acknowledged the “substantial risk”
threshold.105 Alternatively, the dissent argued for a “reasonable probability”
threshold.106 Yet, Clapper left lower courts wondering whether the “certainly
impending” threshold only applies to surveillance cases and whether the
“substantial risk” threshold would be used.
1. The district court finds no present or future injury
A coalition of human-rights attorneys and organizations challenged the
constitutionality of Section 702 of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), arguing that the authorization of warrantless government
surveillance on foreign nationals overseas violated their First and Fourth
Amendment rights.107 The Plaintiffs alleged an imminent injury because they
had an “actual and well-founded” fear (or there was a “realistic danger”) that

Clapper, supra note 10, at 1147.
Id. at 1147-48.
105 Id. at n.5.
106 See id. at 1160-65 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (rejecting the certainly impending as an absolute
floor to standing and arguing that the court has used lower thresholds for granting standing,
concluding that the constitutionally required threshold is something closer to “reasonable
probability” or “high probability”).
107 Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) rev’d sub.
nom., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 2011) rev’d and rem., Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). Section 702 was added to the 1978 FISA by
Section 101(a)(2) of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act (FAA). Id. at 634; 50 U.S.C. §
1881(a)1881a (2015). Section 702 allows warrantless interception and collection of
communications by non-U.S. persons residing outside of the United States when either exigent
circumstances exist or by a favorable finding by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC). 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)1881a (2015); see McConnell, 646 F. Supp.2d at 635-41 (describing
surveillance procedures under Section 702); see generally EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (2013) (discussing the
impacts of section 702). Section 702 is particularly controversial because the government does
not need to show probable cause or “specify the nature and location” of the surveillance.
Clapper, supra note 10, at 1144.
103
104
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their confidential communications with their clients would be monitored
under Section 702.108
The district court held that the Plaintiffs lacked standing because their
surveillance fears were “abstract.”109 Specifically, the district court found that
Section 702 did not actually target the Plaintiffs and that it was “completely
speculative” whether the government would surveille the Plaintiffs’
communication.110 Furthermore, the district court noted that its conclusion
was consistent with those in previous monitoring cases, which all similarly
held that the fear was speculative without specific language targeting a
plaintiff.111
2. The Second Circuit finds standing using an “objectively reasonable
likelihood” threshold
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiffs had standing because
there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that Section 702 would target
their communications.112 Relying on the Court’s rationale in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons,113 the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff can “obtain

See McConnell, supra note 108, at n.12 (hinting there is little difference between the Second
Circuit’s “actual and well-founded fear” and “realistic danger” tests except that the former is
only used when analyzing First Amendment challenges).
109 Id. at 645.
110 Id.
111 See id. at 645-47 (discussing United Presbyterian Church in the U.S v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375
(D.C. Cir. 1984) and Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493, 403 F.3d 644 (6th
Cir. 2007) and noting that both monitoring cases required the Plaintiffs to be specifically
targeted for there to be standing).
112 Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134-39 (2d Cir. 2011) rev’d and rem, Amnesty
Int’l USA v. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1134 (2013). The Second Circuit avoided opining on whether
the required threshold was different when a plaintiff claims avoidance costs against a future
injury versus when a plaintiff only claims a future injury. Id. at 134. Consequently, the Second
Circuit analyzed both the Plaintiffs’ present-injury and future-injury under a reasonable
likelihood standard. Id. at 135. But the Second Circuit hints that standing for present injuries
based on future-anticipated harm requires a lower threshold. Id. at 135 n.17 (“[W]e do not
suggest that actual present injuries may only be traced to governmental action when the causal
connection is as strong as the likelihood of injury required to base standing on contingent
future harms.”).
113 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
108
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standing” when they allege facts showing a “sufficient likelihood of future
injury.”114 Moreover, the Second Circuit emphasized that the likelihood
inquiry was “qualitative, not quantitative”115 and that “the risk of that harm
need not be particularly high.”116
Applying the threshold to the Plaintiffs’ future injury, the Second Circuit
found a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs’ communications with their
clients would be monitored under Section 702.117 In finding an objectively
reasonable likelihood, the Second Circuit noted that intelligence agencies
would likely use Section 702 authorities.118 Additionally, the Second Circuit
agreed that the Plaintiffs’ clients were the type of individuals that Section 702
aimed to monitor.119 Consequently, the Plaintiffs had standing because their
fear of future monitoring was “reasonably likely to occur”.120
3. The Clapper Court emphasizes the “certainly impending” threshold and
acknowledges a “substantial risk” threshold
The Supreme Court rejected the “objectively reasonable likelihood”
threshold for imminent injuries as too permissive.121 Instead, the Court
reemphasized that imminent injuries must be “certainly impending”122 and
held that the Plaintiffs’ alleged future and present injuries fell far short of that
threshold.123 Additionally, the Court held that the Plaintiffs’ claims failed to

Clapper, supra note 108, at 135-36; see Lyons, supra note 114, at 107 n.8 (emphasizing that the
threat’s “reality” determines standing, “not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions”).
115 Clapper, supra note 108, at 137 (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003)).
116 Id. at 137 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 n. 23 (2007)). The Second Circuit
further held that the “totality of the circumstances” governed reasonability, and that the
probability threshold “varies with the severity of the . . . harm.” Id. at 137-38 (quoting Baur,
supra note 116, at 637).
117 Id. at 138-40.
118 Id. at 138.
119 Id. at 138-39.
120 Id. at 140.
121 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1143, 1147.
122 Id. at 1143, 1147.
123 Id. at 1143.
114
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even meet the “substantial risk” standard because their claim was too
attenuated.124 Finally, the Court held that, since Plaintiffs’ fear was
speculative, their avoidance costs could not create standing.125
Like Reilly, the Court emphasized that an injury must be “certainly
impending” for Article III standing.126 And the “certainly impending”
threshold does not allow for “[a]llegations of possible future injury.”127
Moreover, injuries that rest on “speculative fear[s]” or a “highly attenuated
chain of possibilities” are not sufficiently imminent under the “certainly
impending” threshold.128
As applied, the Court held that the Plaintiffs’ future injury was speculative
because they could not show that their communications would be imminently
targeted.129 Furthermore, the Court held that even if the Plaintiffs’
communications were targeted, their injury was still speculative because it
rested on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”130 Specifically, the chain
started with a government decision to target the communications of foreign
contacts with whom the Plaintiffs’ communicate under Section 702 authority
and ended with a successful interception.131 Also, the Court agreed with the
Plaintiffs’ analysis that Section 702 “at most authorizes – but does not mandate
or direct” surveillance against Plaintiffs.132 Thus, since the Plaintiffs’ fear of

Id. at 1150, n.5.
Id. at 1150-52.
126 Id. at 1147.
127 Clapper, supra note 10 (quoting Whitmore, supra note 55, at 158).
128 Id. at 1148.
129 See id. at 1148-49 (noting further that the Plaintiffs failed to allege that their communications
were even brought to a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for approval).
130 Id. at 1148, 1150.
131 See id. at 1148 The Court raises concerns about Plaintiffs’ theory because there is a string of
probabilities from targeting to collection, where the interception fails, an alternate authority is
used, or the interception does not include Plaintiffs’ communication with the client. Id.; accord
Reilly, supra note 73, at 42 (holding that the Plaintiffs did not have standing because their claim
of future injury required that the hacker successfully collect their personal information, intend
to commit crimes with such information, and actually be able to use it to the detriment of the
Plaintiffs).
132 Id. at 1149.
124
125
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injury was highly speculative, the Court found that the future injury failed to
meet the stringent “certainly impending” threshold.133
In explaining the “certainly impending” threshold, the Court’s implied
that the threshold precluded probabilistic analysis for imminent injuries.134
However, the Court acknowledged that it had previously found standing for
some injuries using a “substantial risk” threshold.135 But in doing so, the
Court neither reaffirmed nor defined the threshold.136 Yet, the Court held
that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the “substantial risk” threshold because their
claim was highly attenuated.137
4. The Clapper dissent argues the right balance is between a “high” and a
“reasonable probability”
The Clapper dissent disagreed with the majority that “certainly
impending” was the constitutional threshold and argued, instead, that the
Plaintiffs had a “high likelihood” of being surveilled under Section 702.138
Justice Breyer argued that the standing threshold is “elastic,” ranging from a
fair probability to a certainly impending threshold.139 For instance, the Court
found standing for “probabilistic injuries” – something less than certainty.140
Clapper, supra note 10, at 1150.
See id. at 1147-48 (noting that Plaintiffs’ “fail[ure] to offer any evidence that their
communications have been monitored . . . substantially undermines their standing theory”). By
requiring evidence of interception and holding that injury theories requiring “if” statements
speculative, the Court implies that the injury must be literally certain. See infra part II.B.1.
135 Id. at 1150 n.5. The D.C. Circuit’s substantial risk test relies on probability determinations;
specifically, it examines whether an alleged injury has a substantial chance of occurring. See
infra part II.B.3.
136 See id. The Court affirms the “substantial risk” threshold a year later in Susan B. Anthony List
v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). But the Court has not provided definitive guidance
on when “substantial risk” applies. See Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or
Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law? 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 268-69 (2014) (noting lower
courts’ confusion about when to apply “substantial risk” analysis).
137 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1150 n.5.
138 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1157-58, 1160-61 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
139 See id. at 1160 (recognizing that “imminence” is an “elastic concept” (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992)).
140 See id. at 1160-61 (noting that the court has allowed standing, in many case, on “probabilistic
injuries” and emphasizing that “certainly” should not “literally define[] . . . impending”).
133
134
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In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms141 found standing on a “substantial risk”
of injury.142 Thus, imminent injuries do not require “literal certainty,” only a
sufficient likelihood of occurrence.143 Thus, Justice Breyer argued that the
constitutional threshold was closer to a “’high probability’ or ‘reasonable
probability.’”144
When determining that the Plaintiffs had a “high likelihood” of being
surveilled, Justice Breyer pointed to several factors that raised the likelihood
of Plaintiffs being harmed under Section 702.145 He noted that the
“Government has a strong motive to listen to” these ongoing discussions,146
and that the Government has previously intercepted similar types of
communications.147 Taking in these factors as a whole, Justice Breyer
concluded that Plaintiffs’ fear was not “speculative.”148
D. District courts disagree as to whether HRIT injuries are precluded under Clapper
After Clapper, data-breach litigation has increased as more companies are
compelled by state laws to report any exposure or loss of PII.149 Different
district courts resolving such cases have reached two conflicting conclusions
from Clapper, Pisciotta, Knotter, and Reilly: the first is that Clapper now requires a
561 U.S. 139 (2010).
Id. at 1160-63 (quoting Monsanto Co., supra note 142, at 153); see, e.g., id. at 1161 (noting that
the Court in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), found standing when nursing home
residents faced a “sufficiently substantial” risk of being transferred to a “less desirable home”
under a new regulation (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 999-1001).
143 Id. at 1160, 1162. 1165.
144 See id. at 1165 (arguing the Courts deny standing when an injury is “less likely” to occur).
Substantial risk could be akin to high probability of occurrence and objectively reasonable
likelihood could be likened to a mere possibility of occurrence. Compare notes 112-116 and
accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s test) with notes 296-301 and accompanying
text (discussing D.C. Circuit’s substantial risk test).
145 Id. at 1157, 1159 (“The upshot is that (1) similarity of content, (2) strong motives, (3) prior
behavior, and (4) capacity all point to a very strong likelihood the Government will
intercept...at least some of the . . .plaintiffs’ communications.”).
146 Id. at 1158.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1160.
149 See DAVID ZETOONY ET AL., 2015, DATA BREACH LITIGATION REPORT 4 (2015) (showing
that the number of class action complaint filings over an eighteen-month period has grown).
141
142
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higher threshold for imminent injuries, in all cases and, consequently, older
circuit opinions no longer control;150 the second is that Clapper can be
reconciled with previous cases because either (a) Clapper only emphasized
heightened scrutiny for government surveillance151 or (b) Clapper
acknowledged the “substantial risk” threshold and, therefore, did not
foreclose probabilistic future-injuries.152
Many courts consistently hold that Clapper forecloses all HRIT cases by
rejecting the “objectively reasonable likelihood” test and by emphasizing that
“possible future injur[ies]” are insufficient for Article III standing.153 For
instance, the court in In re Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation interpreted the “certainly impending”
threshold to bar risk-based (probabilistic) analysis, holding that the “degree by
which the risk of harm has increased is irrelevant.”154 Similarly, other courts
do not consider the amount or sensitivity of the information stolen, the intent
of the hacker (to the extent it is known), or whether anyone in the class had

See In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d
14, 25-26, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that Clapper rejected the “objectively reasonable likelihood”
threshold and holding that Clapper has overruled pre-Clapper circuit opinions using lower
thresholds for imminent injuries).
151 See In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp.3d 2d 943, 960-63 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding
that Clapper “reiterated an already well-established framework” and that victims can still sue
under a theory of heightened risk when their personal information is wrongfully disclosed).
152 See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211-16 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(holding that Clapper did not change standing law and that injuries causing a “substantial risk”
of harm are still allowed).
153 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1147; see Peters, supra note 11, at 855 (holding that under Clapper, an
increased risk of harm from data breaches, alone, does make an injury “certainly impending”);
see also Storm, supra note 11, at 364-68 (noting that even if the identity-theft risk was “likely or
probable,” it would still fail to meet the certainly-impending threshold); see also Strautins v.
Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875-79 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Clapper compels
rejection . . . that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement for standing.”); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 WL
4759588, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013) (“the increased risk of identity theft is insufficient to
convey standing . . . .”).
154 See In re SAIC, supra note 151, at 25 (responding to the Plaintiffs’ assertion that they are “9.5
times more likely . . . to become victims of identity theft”); but see Galaria v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“An injury can hardly be said to be
‘certainly impending’ if there is less than a [twenty] percent chance of it occurring.”).
150
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already suffered identity theft.155 However in other instances, the courts have
quantified the “certainly impending” threshold by requiring that the
probability of harm rise to a particular level before it finds a sufficiently
imminent injury.156
In denying standing under the “certainly impending” threshold, many
courts apply Reilly’s and Clapper’s “if test” to HRIT cases.157 Specifically, the
injury is speculative under the “certainly impending” threshold when it
requires an ‘if’ condition to be satisfied.158 For instance, in a data-breach case,
a future injury occurs only “if the hacker read, copied, and understood the
hacked information, and if the hacker attempts to use the information and if
he does so successfully.”159 Since many data-breach victims cannot
demonstrate an identity theft without using the word “if,” many courts have
found their injury speculative.160 Additionally, the courts have also expressed
concerns about the uncertainty of the hacker’s actions as an “independent
third party,” as noted in both Reilly and Clapper.161 Because the court cannot
See Peters, supra note 11, at 856 (noting that Clapper resolved the circuit split from Knotter,
Pisciotta, and Reilly, and denied Plaintiffs standing even though there were some instances of
attempted identity theft); In re Barnes & Noble, 2013 WL 4759588 at *2, *5 (declining to grant
standing even though there was instance of identity theft).
156 See Galaria, supra note 155, 654 (requiring at a least twenty percent chance of occurring).
157 See infra notes 281-289 and accompanying text; see also Green v. eBay Inc., CIV.A. No. 141688,. 2015 WL 2066531, at *5 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (noting that whether the Plaintiff
suffers an injury “depends on numerous variables”); Peters, supra note 11, at 854 (noting the
Plaintiff “cannot describe [her] injurie[s] without . . . the word ‘if.” (quoting Storino v. Point
Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 298 (3d. Cir. 2003))); Storm, supra note 11, at 365 (discussing
Reilly’s “if” test and applying it to a data breach case); cf. In re Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. Data
Breach Litig., CIV.A. No. 13–7418, 2015 WL 1472483, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2015) appeal field
(noting Reilly’s holding that physical theft (as opposed to intrusion) creates an even more
attenuated injury because the abilities of the “crook” to take advantage of the theft are
unknown).
158 Clapper, supra note 10, at 1148 (2013); Reilly, supra note 73, at 43.
159 Reilly, supra note 73, at 43.
160 Storm, supra note 11, at 365.
161 See Clapper, supra note 10, at 1150, 1164 n.5 (declining to support standing when injuries rely
on “independent actors”); Lujan, supra note 53, at 562 (noting the court’s reluctance to find
standing when the “asserted injury arises from the government’s . . . regulation . . . of someone
else” who is not “before the courts” because the courts cannot “control” or “predict” their
actions); Reilly, supra note 73, at 42 (noting that the injury “is dependent on entirely speculative,
future actions of an unknown third-party”); See In re SAIC, supra note 151, at 25-26 (“Courts . .
. are reluctant to grant standing where the alleged future injury depends on . . .the actions of. an
independent party.”).
155
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find an injury without first assuming that the hacker, thief, or other actor will
have the knowledge and the will to exploit the stolen information, the court
relying on Clapper and/or Reilly will find no standing.162 The reasoning behind
the court’s reluctance for standing when the injury depends on third-party
actions is also a basis for distinguishing analogies to medical devices, toxic
exposure, and environmental damage.163
On the other hand, other courts disagree that Clapper found Article III
standing under a HRIT by relying on previous circuit holdings and
distinguishing Clapper because Clapper the constitutionality of surveillance law
and, thus, did not change standing law.164 To some extent, this is because
Clapper partially relied on Laird v. Tatum.165 Consequently, there were
conflicting views about how far Laird’s holding went in framing what kinds of
“fear-based injur[ies]” or imminent injuries are acceptable.166 Because Clapper
relies partially on Laird’s holdings, there is reasonable confusion as to whether
Clapper’s interpretation of a stringent “certainly impending” standard for
imminent injuries is more specific towards surveillance law, or whether it
covers all cases concerning imminent injury.167 This premise is further

See In re Horizon Healthcare Services, 2015 WL 1472483 at *6 (holding that injures depending
on a “third party bandit” are “inadequate” for Article III standing); see also Galaria, supra note
155, at 655 (holding that the Plaintiffs’ future injury is speculative because it depends on thirdparty actors); Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc. 988 F. Supp. 2d 451, 466-67 (D.N.J. 2013) (discussing
Reilly and assumed third-party actions).
163 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
164 See In re Adobe Sys., supra note 153, at 1211-14 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to adopt Adobe’s
argument that Clapper “intended a wide reaching revision” of standing and noting that the
circumstances in Clapper were more sensitive because they concerned whether the government
had violated the Constitution); Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL
3511500, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 14, 2014) (disagreeing that Clapper overruled Pisciotta and noting
that Driehaus upholds a lower standing threshold); In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer
Data Sec. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961-62 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that Krottner and Clapper
can be reconciled because “real and immediate” and “certainly impending” are essentially the
same standard).
165 92 S. Ct. 2318, 2321-23 (1972). Laird also concerned surveillance law.
166 See Sand, supra note 102, at 716-21 (discussing Laird and arguing that three interpretations of
Laird emerged on the Supreme Court).
167 See Clapper, supra note 10 at 1152 (discussing Laird); John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson,
Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly
Impending”? 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 5, 48-51, 81 (2014) (noting that courts remain split on
Clapper’s implication in data-breach cases); see also Moyer, supra note 165, at *6 (distinguishing
162
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supported by Clapper’s language, holding that the court is wary of granting
standing where intelligence and “foreign affairs” are involved.168
Some courts acknowledge that Clapper reemphasized the stringent
“certainly impending” threshold for imminent injuries, but note Clapper’s
willingness to accept some imminent injuries where there is a “substantial
risk” of harm. And these courts analyze data-breach cases under both
standards with various outcomes.169 However, other courts acknowledge a
“substantial risk” threshold but do not offer any discussion on how the
threshold affects a Plaintiffs’ HRIT case.170 Still other courts, like the court in
SAIC, have quantified the “substantial risk” threshold of harm because eighty
percent of the victims may not experience identity theft.171
One crucial discriminating factor that district courts do look to when
finding standing is whether some victims, within a class, have already
experienced successful or attempted identity theft.172 Other courts consider
the time between the lawsuit and the actual breach, arguing that the longer a
victim goes without experiencing any attempted or actual identity theft, the

Clapper to “national security and constitutional issues”); Strautins, supra note 154, at at 878 n.11
(noting that the court makes closer examinations of standing when Plaintiffs challenge actions
“by the Legislative or Executive branches of government”).
168 Clapper, supra note 10 at 1147.
169 See Remijas, supra note 12, at 693-694 (arguing the Supreme Court did not “jettison” the
‘‘substantial risk’” standard); see also In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 956-57 (D.
Nev. 2015) (noting that “substantial risk” and Krottner’s standard for imminent injury are the
same); In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25-26 (noting that a Plaintiff can plead a sufficient risk if
the “risk of harm” is “substantial); Moyer, supra note 165, at *4, *5 (relying on the “substantial
risk” standard to find standing).
170 See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 663-65 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (acknowledging
the “substantial risk” standard but granting standing based on previous instances of identity
theft); Strautins, supra note 154, at 876, 876 n.8 (acknowledging “substantial risk” but,
nevertheless, holding that Plaintiffs do not meet the “certainly impending” threshold); In re
Barnes & Noble, supra note 156, at *3, *5 (acknowledging “substantial risk” as a standard but
holding that an “increased risk of identity theft” is not enough for standing).
171 In re SAIC, supra note 151, at 26 (holding that the probability is insufficient to meet the D.C.
Circuit’s requirement that there is “(i) a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial
probability of harm with that increase taken into account” (quoting Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
172 See Enslin, supra note 171, at 664-65 (distinguishing Reilly and Clapper because the Plaintiff
had to spend “time, effort, and money” to mitigate actual identity theft); In re SAIC, supra note
151, at 33-34 (allowing two of thirty-three identity theft cases to proceed because they alleged
actual injury).
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less likely she has a sufficiently “immediate” injury.173 There are, yet, other
courts that distinguish between the sophisticated hacker and the physical
thief, arguing that it is more plausible that a sophisticated hacker can
successfully exploit the PII.174 Also, on the administrative side, the courts
have supported federal agencies’ claims on mere allegations that a data breach
could potentially cause millions of dollars in loss from fraud and identity
theft.175
E. Remijas recognizes that previous and subsequent Supreme Court cases have not
consistently applied Clapper’s “certainly impending” threshold.
The Clapper decision created confusion amongst the circuits about how
far its heightened threshold went in other contexts. There were several major
points of confusion. First, the “certainly impending” standard was never
uniformly applied in every case. Second, many previous and subsequent cases
had found standing on lower thresholds that did not focus on immediacy and
certainty. Third, the Driehaus Court reaffirmed that “substantial risk”
threshold for determining standing was valid. Consequently, the Remijas
Court recognized these discrepancies and found standing for HRIT victims
on the “substantial risk” standing. In doing so, the Remijas Court reminded
courts not to “overread” Clapper.

See Remijas, supra note 170, at 693 (disagreeing that the Plaintiffs claim to standing falls as
“more time passes between a data breach and an instance of identity theft” (quoting In re
Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215, n.5)); In re Zappos, supra note 170, at 957-59 (noting that Plaintiffs
claim that injury was imminent may have been credible in 2012, but cannot confer standing
after “three-and-a-half-years” pass without actual evidence of identity theft).
174 See In re Adobe Sys., supra note 153, at 1215-16 (rhetorically questioning why a sophisticated
hacker would “target and steal” personal information “if not to misuse it”).
175 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 622-24 (D.N.J. 2014).
173
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1. Whitmore v. Arkansas establishes the “certainly impending” threshold for
imminent injuries
In Clapper, Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that “’imminence’ is . . . a
somewhat elastic concept.” 176 Along those lines, Justice Breyer correctly
noted that in Clapper the “certainly impending” language was not always used
as a constitutionally minimum threshold.177 The Court in Whitmore v.
Arkansas178 transformed the “certainly impending” requirement from a
sufficient threshold to a necessary condition.179
After Whitmore, the language changed to require “[a] threatened injury
must be “’certainly impending.’”180 From there, the “certainly impending”
threshold later appeared in Lujan, where Justice Scalia explicitly relates the
standard to a time dimension and the certainty of injury.181 From Lujan and
Whitmore, the “certainly impending” threshold became the requirement for the
Clapper Plaintiffs.182

Clapper, supra note 10, at 1160 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Id.
178 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
179 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 (“A threatened injury must be
“certainly impending’” to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979))). But Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, which was quoted in
Babbitt, used “certainly impending” as a sufficient standard, not a necessary one. See
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 554, 593–95 (1923) (noting if the harm “is certainly
impending, that is enough”). A review of cases prior to Whitmore used the sufficient standard.
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); Blanchette v. Conn.
Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974).
180 Id. at 158 (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298).
181 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 553, 566 n.2 (1992) (holding that the
imminence requirement is exceptionally important when the “acts necessary to make the injury
happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control” to prevent the courts from
deciding cases without an injury-in-fact). Justice Scalia also emphasized that “imminence” is
not limited to situations where an injury is dependent on a third-party actor. Id.
182 See supra Part I.C.3. and accompanying notes.
176
177
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2. Prior Supreme Court cases have applied lower thresholds in different
contexts
Although the Court insisted that imminent injuries must meet the
“certainly impending” threshold, the Court has previously found standing
under lower thresholds. For instance, cases involving environmental
regulation or First Amendment challenges have not invoked the “certainly
impending” threshold.
The Court has found standing where a party is at “substantial risk” of
falling within the scope of an allegedly unconstitutional criminal statute and
does not require an inevitable conflict between a statute’s operation and a
party’s activity.183 For instance, the Court found standing in Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers National Union184 when there was a “realistic danger” that United
Farm Workers (UFW) would face prosecution under a state statute that made
it unlawful to use “dishonest, untruthful, and deceptive publicity” when
influencing agricultural consumers.185 And where there is a “credible threat,”
a plaintiff “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.”186
The Court has also applied “substantial risk” thresholds when deciding
environmental regulatory challenges. For instance, the Court granted
standing in Massachusetts v. EPA,187 holding that the EPA’s “refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions”188 created both an “’actual’ and [an] ‘imminent’”

See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary that petitioner first
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims
deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”).
184 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
185 See id. at 297–99, 301–02 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1385(B)(8) (2016)) (finding
standing when a plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution is not “imaginary or wholly speculative,” even if
the “criminal penalty provision . . . may never be applied”).
186 Id. at 298 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)).
187 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
188 Id. at 521. The Court creates some ambiguity within the standing issue by holding that
Massachusetts has “special solicitude.” See id. at 520 (emphasizing that “States are not normal
litigants [when] invoking federal jurisdiction” (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Id. at 518.
183
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injury to the Plaintiffs.189 The EPA had interpreted that “air pollutants,”
within the meaning of Clean Air Act, did not include motor- vehicle carbon
emissions, so the agency had no authority to regulate it.190 Conversely,
Massachusetts argued that if the EPA did not regulate “greenhouse gas
emissions,” the sea level could rise and potentially damage coastal lands.191
The Court agreed, pointing to “objective and independent assessment[s]”192
concluding that greenhouses gases have already caused “significant harms.”193
The Court also acknowledged testimony that “[fourteen] acres of land per
miles of coastline” could be lost “by [the year] 2100.”194 Thus, the Court
concluded that Massachusetts had a “remote” risk of “catastrophic” injury,
which is sufficient for Article III standing.195
Another example is Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms where the Court
found standing when Geertson sued the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APIHS) when it failed to conduct an environmental impact
assessment prior to deregulating genetically engineered alfalfa seeds, as
required by the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act.196 Geertson argued
that by failing to issue an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), there was
high risk that non-modified alfalfa seeds would be contaminated by
genetically modified seeds, and conventional famers would have to raise
prices to cover for testing and contamination control.197 The district court

Id. at 521 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
See id. at 521, 528 (noting EPA’s conclusion that “climate change was so important” it could
not “address it” without some explicit guidance from Congress).
191 Id. at 499.
192 Id. at 521 (quoting Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. 52922-02, 52930 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
193 Id. at 521.
194 Id. at 523 n.20.
195 Id. at 526. The Court, at least in this case, supported two additional theories. The first is
that “even a small probability of injury . . . create[s] a case or controversy.” Id. at 525 n.23
(quoting Village of Elk Grove v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)). The second theory
is that the more severe an alleged future injury could be, the less likely it needs to be for
standing purposes. Id. (citing Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,
1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
196 561 U.S. 139, 144, 153 (2010).
197 Id. at 153–56.
189
190
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held there was a “reasonable probability” of contamination, and the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that there was a “significant” or “substantial risk of
gene flow” to non-modified alfalfa.198 In doing so, the Court acknowledged
that Geertson’s expenses to avoid contamination were reasonable.199
3. Driehaus reaffirms the “substantial risk” test as a valid threshold for
imminent injuries
Although the Court had arguably left the question of whether “substantial
risk” was still a valid threshold, it reaffirmed the “substantial risk” test in
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus.200 In Driehaus, the Court held that Susan B.
Anthony List (SBAL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, had standing to
challenge an Ohio statute criminalizing “false statement[s]” about the “voting
record of a candidate or public official” during any “nomination or election”
campaign.201 SBAL had publically accused a congressional candidate,
Driehaus, of voting for the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which “includes
taxpayer-funded abortion.”202 In response, Driehaus went to the Ohio
Elections Commission, which investigated whether SBAL had made false
statements about his voting record.203 Consequently, SBAL challenged the

See id. at 141, 151–52 (rejecting the argument that there was no imminent injury because
there was no way of knowing how the environmental impact analysis would turn out).
199 See id. at 154–55 (noting that the additional costs to test crops is a valid injury “even if their
crops are not actually infected”).
200 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
201 Id. at 2338 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B) (Lexis 2013)). Ohio’s statute
allowed anyone with “personal knowledge” to “file a complaint with the Ohio Elections
Commission.” Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.153(A) (Lexis Supp. 2014)). Once a
complaint was filed, the Commission would create a panel and hold a hearing to determine
whether there was probable cause of a violation. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3517.156(B)(1), (C) (Lexis 2013)). If there was probable cause, the full Commission held a
more extensive hearing, and if there was “clear and convincing evidence” of a violation, the
Commission was required to either “refer the matter to the relevant county prosecutor” or
“issue a reprimand.” Id. at 2339 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.155(D)(1) (2) (Lexis
Supp. 2014)) (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3517-1-10(E) (2008); § 3517-1-14(D)).
202 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2339 (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 525 Fed. Appx. 415,
416 (6th Cir. 2013) (unreported) rev’d, Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.).
203 Id.
198
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statute as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.204 But before
anything could proceed, Driehaus lost the election and withdrew his SBAL
complaint.205 Still, SBAL moved forward with its constitutional claim,
arguing that the statute “chill[s]” First Amendment speech because SBAL
intends to operate similarly in the future, and that modus operand would
likely trigger the statute’s criminal provisions.206 But the district court
dismissed for a lack of concrete injury.207 And the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
holding there is no imminent injury because SBAL did not have any “plans to
lie . . . in the future.”208
The Supreme Court reversed and agreed with SBAL and COAST,
holding that both organizations faced an imminent injury.209 The Court
found standing on three points: (1) SBAL’s expressed intent to continue
activities that would likely trigger the statute;210 (2) the added threat of

Id. at 2339–40. The SBAL suit alleged that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional on its face
and as-applied. Id. at 2340. There have been a number of First Amendment challenges under
a theory that the statute “chills” free speech because the statute is overbroad; the courts have
been more willing to grant standing in these cases. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (noting that
the courts will allow facial challenges, involving the First Amendment, when the statute has
“too many unconstitutional applications” and that the courts are sensitive about this doctrine
because it bypasses traditional third-party standing rules). For non-First Amendment
overbreadth challenges, the court has been fairly restrictive on facial challenges. See United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (holding that, outside of First Amendment
challenges, overbreadth challenges require a showing that the statute is unconstitutional in every
case); see also Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 359, 360–67 (1998) (discussing overbreadth facial challenges and
Salerno). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CAL. L. REV.
915 (2011) (arguing that in many Supreme Court terms, facial challenges had a higher success
rate than as-applied challenges).
205 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2340 (noting that SBAL adjusted its pleading to a theory of
imminent injury, arguing that it faces future financial burdens in defending itself should
another complaint arise under the statute); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, Nos. 113894, 11-3925, 2013 WL 1942821, at *3 (6th Cir. May 13, 2013) (noting that there was no “final
decision” on SBAL).
206 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2340.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 2340–41 (quoting Driehaus, 2013 WL 1942821, at *7).
209 Id. at 2347.
210 Id. at 2343–44.
204
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criminal prosecution;211 and that (3) the “threat of future enforcement . . .
[was] substantial.”212
The court relied on Babbitt213 and held that SBAL’s expressed intent to
continue discussing candidates’ voting records fell within the statute’s
scope.214 Moreover, the Court found that, in addition to “administrative
action,” both organizations faced criminal prosecution from the statute’s
operation, and this layered threat created a sufficiently imminent injury.215
More importantly, the Court found that the “threat of future enforcement of
the false statement statute is substantial.”216 In doing so, the Court made a
direct comparison to Clapper and noted that the Commission’s probable-cause
finding implies past enforcement, which is “good evidence that the threat . . .
is not ‘chimerical.’”217

Id. at 2346.
Id. at 2345.
213 See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“When the plaintiff has
alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional
interest, but proscribed by a statute, there exists a credible threat of prosecution [and] he
‘should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief.’” (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973))).
214 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2343–45.
215 Id. at 2345–46. For standing under a threatened prosecution theory, the plaintiff must show
that her behavior will likely lead to criminal prosecution under a challenged statute; it is not
enough that the plaintiff is pleading a possible future injury based on “[p]ast exposure to illegal
conduct” that does not have “present adverse effects.” See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
495–97 (1974) (noting a lack of any “allegations that any relevant criminal statute . . . is
unconstitutional”). This slightly distinguishes pre-enforcement challenges with heightened risk
arguments. See Calabrese, supra note 67, at 1460–71 (distinguishing “pre-enforcement fear” and
“anticipatory harm); compare Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105(1983) (denying standing to
challenge anticipatory fear of police chokeholds because it was speculative that it could happen
again) with Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 14–16 (2010) (granting standing in
a pre-enforcement challenge when a statute outlawed assisting certain organizations).
216 Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2345.
217 Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). In Steffel, the Court found a
sufficient injury-in-fact when Plaintiff challenged a Georgia statute prohibiting “handbilling”
after he was told by police on two different occasions that he would be arrested if he continued
to handbill at a shopping center, and after his associate was actually arrested. Steffel, 415 U.S. at
454–56, 459, 471–72.
211
212
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4. The Remijas Court finds standing for HRIT victims under the “substantial
risk” standard
Remijas is the first circuit court case on standing in HRIT post-Clapper.218
The Seventh Circuit found standing for Neiman Marcus breach victims,
reversing the District Court’s judgment and holding that Clapper did not
foreclose HRIT cases under the “substantial risk” threshold.219 Additionally,
Remijas cautioned that Clapper should not be “overread” to have changed
standing law.220 Specifically, Remijas distinguished Clapper on its facts, noting
that the Court did not find standing because the Plaintiffs claims were highly
attenuated in that specific case.221
Neiman Marcus announced on January 23, 2014 that its servers were
breached by malware.222 The malware had allowed attackers to skim nearly
1.1 million payment cards between July 16 and October 30, 2013, more than
six months prior.223 Immediately following the attack, many Neiman Marcus
customers reported credit-card fraud.224
Shortly afterwards, Neiman Marcus reported another successful second
attack on January 29, 2016, where hackers used brute-force225 attempts to
794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 696–97.
220 Id. at 694.
221 Id. at 693.
222 Byron Acohido, Timeline: Target, Neiman Marcus Disclosures, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:33
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2014/01/23/timeline-target-neimanmarcus-disclosures/4799153/.)
223 Id. The disclosure occurred shortly after an outside security analyst had suspected a breach.
Brian Krebs, Hackers Steal Card Data from Neiman Marcus, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2014,
6:56 PM), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/01/hackers-steal-card-data-from-neimanmarcus; see Lily Hay Newman, A 17-Year Old Was Behind the Target, Neiman Marcus Credit Card
Hacks, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2014, 1:30 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/01/20/target_neiman_marcus_credit_card_
number_hacks_were_caused_by_a_17_year_old.html) (noting that the timing of Neiman
Marcus’ disclosure was controversial).
224 Tracy Kitten, Neiman Marcus Reports New Breach, BANK INFO SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2016).
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-neiman-marcus-breach-authentication-must-change-a8843.
225 Brute Force is a basic technique where an attacker randomly guesses a targets’ username and
password to gain access. See MILES TRACY ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF SCI. & TECH., DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. 800-44, VERSION 2, GUIDELINES ON SECURING PUBLIC WEB
218
219
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access 5,200 accounts. Neiman Marcus reported that there were nearly
seventy successful breaches with subsequent fraudulent purchases.
The victims sued Neiman Marcus under “negligence, breach of implied
contract . . . unfair and deceptive business practices,” and other common law
tort theories.226 The district court acknowledged that some 9,200 payment
cards belonging to 350,000 customers were fraudulently used.227 Although
the District Court used the “certainly impending” threshold, it distinguished
Clapper’s analysis as “especially rigorous” because it implicated national
security and constitutional issues.228 Instead, the District Court reconciled
Pisciotta and Clapper by holding that the line between imminent and speculative
injury was confirmed data theft.229 But this did not save the plaintiffs’ case
because they did not have a HRIT, only a risk for future fraudulent charges.230
And fraudulent charges is not sufficiently “concrete” because the victims
were reimbursed for the fraudulent transactions.231
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that all 350,000 class members had
standing at the pleading stage.232 The Seventh Circuit held that probabilistic
injuries, such as HRIT, were still allowed under the “substantial risk”
threshold.233 The Seventh Circuit further held that HRIT victims “should not
SERVERS 7-12, 7-13 (2007) (defining brute force attacks). Even though the technique is timetested, there are many ways to harden systems against brute-force attacks, and there was
skepticism among some experts as to whether this was a brute-force attack. Kitten, supra note
224.
226 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 2014 WL 4627893, No. 14 C 1735, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 16,
2014) (unreported) rev’d, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
227 Id.
228 Id. at *2, *3
229 See id. at *3 (distinguishing various cases on the likelihood of data misuse).
230 See id. at *3–4 (acknowledging that the 350,000 victims may be at imminent risk of future
fraudulent charges but holding that this translated to a “certainly impending risk of identity
theft” was “a leap too far”). Although the District Court did not explain its rationale for
drawing the distinction, it was probably discussing the differences between identity theft and
identity fraud. See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RES. SERV., R40599, IDENTITY THEFT: TRENDS
AND ISSUES 3 (2014) (describing identity theft as a specific form of identity fraud). This
distinction may have been drawn because the only data exposed was credit card information.
Acohido, supra note 222.
231 Id. Remijas, 2014 WL 4627893, at *3.
232 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
233 Id. at 693 (noting “Clapper’s recognition that a substantial risk will sometimes suffice” for
standing).
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have to wait [for] . . . credit-card fraud” to occur if there is an “’objectively
reasonable likelihood’” of it occurring.234 Finally, the Seventh Circuit raised
concerns that requiring identity theft to actually occur before finding standing
could create “more latitude” for defendants to argue traceability.235
As applied, the Seventh Circuit found a concrete injury in both the time
required to resolve fraudulent transactions and the possibility of new-account
fraud in the future.236 The Seventh Circuit also recognized that “fraudulent
use . . . may continue for years.”237 And emphasized that 9,200 accounts have
already been stolen and experienced fraudulent charges.238 Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit held that it was a reasonable inference that the hackers
intended to commit credit-card and identity fraud.239
II.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court emphasizes that an “actual” or “imminent” injury is
the constitutional minimum to satisfy Article III’s “case” or “controversy”
requirement.240 But even if the Constitution, in theory, mandates

Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)).
Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215, n.5 (N.D. Cal.
2014)). Many courts use the time element to show why a data-breach victim does not have any
substantial risk of harm. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 108
F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev. 2015) (“Even if Plaintiffs’ [HRIT] was substantial and
immediate in 2012, the passage of time without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact
suffered the harm they fear must mean something.”).
236 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692–93, 696.
237 Id. at 694 (quoting U.S. GOVT’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007)).
238 Id. at 692.
239 See id. at 693 (“Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’
private information?”)
240 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (recognizing a
“constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction” to “cases” or “controversies”) (quoting
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493, n.2 (1974) (A plaintiff “must show actual or threatened injury” for constitutional
standing); R.S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1973) (noting that “federal plaintiffs must allege
some threatened or actual injury” for standing).
234
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a sufficient injury, it is silent on how imminent the injury must be.241
Consequently, the Court has varied the threshold requirement when it
contemplates the separation-of-powers doctrine and the severity of the
potential.242 More specifically, the Court has relaxed the standing threshold
the more severe the injury and has heightened its standing requirements the
more the separation-of-power concerns are present. The “certainly
impending” threshold used in Clapper reflected both the Court’s perspective
that there were heightened separation-of-powers concerns in the Court
interfering with national security and intelligence-related matters, and the
Court’s possible perspective Plaintiffs’ did not face severe consequences
flowing from government surveillance. Within this context, data-breach case
victims raise little separation-of-powers concerns because it does neither
affects, nor questions the constitutionality of, government activity.
Furthermore, data-breach victims face a range of potential consequences,
ranging from life-threatening discrepancies in their medical records to
spending notable hours fixing fraudulent transactions.
Yet, many courts have applied the rigorous “certainly impending”
standard to almost all post-Clapper cases of heightened risk, defending this
practice as applying the constitutionally minimum threshold.243 In doing so,
those courts forget the primary purpose of standing law: the reluctance, of the
courts, to decide whether the actions of the coordinate branches are
constitutional without some certainty that a private injury would occur.244
Thus, the courts should not apply such rigorous thresholds in HRIT cases.
Instead, the courts should recognize the Supreme Court’s willingness, both

Cf. Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 66–70 (arguing that Article III does not require the
court to base standing on the probability that the harm will occur).
242 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559, 560 (1992) (noting that although
standing is “essential” to Article III, some of the elements are “merely prudential”); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (noting that the justiciability doctrine “has become a blend of
constitutional requirements and policy considerations” and that the two are not “always clearly
distinguished” (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)).
243 See supra Part I.D.
244 See supra Part I.B.1.
241
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pre- and post-Clapper, to consider probabilistic injuries under a “substantial
risk” or “reasonably likely” threshold. And as part of a “substantial risk”
analysis, courts should consider several risk factors within data breach cases
that raise or lessen the chances that victims will face identity theft in the near
future.
A. The Standing Threshold is Context-Specific; “Substantial Risk” is Used When the
Separation of Powers Concerns is Low or the Severity of the Injury is High
Although the Supreme Court has expanded and restricted standing law
over time, it has also applied standing law differently to different contexts.245
First, the Court has emphasized that imminent harms must be “certainly
impending,” a stringent standard that has been applied to prevent the Court
from interfering with the other political branches. Second, the Court has
indicated some willingness to relax standing rules when the imminent harm is
severe. Applying these two factors, the Court demands that an injury be
“certainly impending” when there are heightened separation-of-powers
concerns and the anticipated harm is not substantial. However, the Court
should only require a plaintiff have a reasonable or “substantial” risk of injury
when there are little separation-of-powers concerns and the anticipation harm
is catastrophic. Data-breach lawsuits generally have little separation-ofpowers concerns, but, depending on the circumstances, the consequences can
range from financial to life-threatening issues.

See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORN. L. REV. 275, 275–
90 (2008) [hereinafter Standing and Private Rights] (discussing the history of the Court’s approach
to standing law).
245
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1. Separation-of-powers concerns abate when government activity is not
involved
Modern and historical standing law reflects the Courts’ reluctance to
usurp the political branches by entertaining constitutional challenges to
government actions without some certainty of a particularized injury.246 But
whether a case has heightened separation-of-powers concerns should turn on
the type of issue, not on the likelihood of injury.247 Otherwise stated, if
standing law preserves the separation-of-powers, the imminence threshold
would rise when a wide range of government activities are implicated.248 But
likewise, the imminence threshold should be relaxed where a case does not
require a court to decide on the constitutionality of government activities.
For instance, most data-breach victims sue on common-law tort claims, e.g.
negligence or breach of contract, where the courts need not opine on a
statutes’ constitutionality. Conversely, the Clapper Court had to decide on the
constitutionality of government surveillance within a national security
framework. Even if, hypothetically, the likelihood of injury was similar in
both cases, the data-breach cases would not have the same separation-ofpowers concerns.
Taken to the extreme, the constitutional minimum for standing should be
minimal when the courts are not required to decide on the constitutionality of
legislation, regulation, or government action because there are no separation-

See, e.g., Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2695 (2015)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that standing doctrine is “built on a single basic idea – the idea of
separation of powers”); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (noting
that constitutional standing is “built on separation-of-powers principles”); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (noting that it is Congress’ responsibility, not the courts,’ to rule on the
“soundness of Executive action”); see also Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 68–80
(discussing the historical basis for requiring imminent or threatened injuries to be at least
“probable”)
247 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99–101 (1968).
248 See supra note 246 and accompanying text; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
564, n.2 (1992) (noting that the “certainly impending” threshold reduces the likelihood a Court
would opine a case without injury). But see Flast, 392 U.S at 101 (emphasizing that it is
“substantive issues . . . to [be] adjudicated” that creates the separation-of-powers concerns).
246
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of-powers concerns.249 The D.C. Circuit noted its concerns about “increasedrisk” cases because “[m]uch government regulation slightly increases [the] risk of
injury,” and courts must, therefore, limit cases to those involving actual or
imminent harm.250 But if the D.C. Circuit is the correct, then the injury
requirement, and arguably much of constitutional standing, rests on whether
government action is being challenged. Anything more rests on more policy
and prudential concerns, which are flexible.251
Within this framework, Clapper, at most, re-emphasized existing
requirements for plaintiffs who challenge government action on constitutional grounds,
objecting to these cases where lower courts apply an “objectively reasonable
likelihood” standard.252 Furthermore, a review of almost every subsequent
Supreme Court case (after Pennsylvania) explicitly referencing the “certainly
impending” standard involved a challenge to statute, regulation, or
government action on constitutional grounds.253 Also, Clapper emphasized
See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110 (1969) (holding that “constitutional question[s]”
about congressional acts require a live controversy); Flast, 392 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J.
concurring) (“The case or controversy requirement comes into play only when the Federal
Government does something . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 100–02 (per
curium) (holding that the minimum requirement of Article III standing is that the plaintiff has
“a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 204)
and that “the dispute touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’”
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 at 240–41)); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 488 (1923) (holding that “acts of Congress” are only reviewable on constitutional grounds
when the party can show actual or threatened injury).
250 Pub Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety, Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (emphasis added).
251 See Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 91–92 (arguing that prudential rules help to advance
many of the courts objectives, such as reducing “potential plaintiff” and ensuring that the issue
is sharply presented for good resolution).
252 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–49 (noting heightened scrutiny when passing on the
constitutionality of government activities is inconsistent with the “objectively reasonable
likelihood” test); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) (“[T]o invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he . . . is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury) (emphasis added); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794
F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (cautioning courts not to “overread Clapper”).
253 See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (challenging Ohio
statute on First Amendment grounds); Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142 (challenging the
constitutionality of government surveillance); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,
337–38 (2006) (declining to grant taxpayer standing when they challenged Ohio law providing
tax credits); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224–26 (2003) (challenging an amendment to the
1934 Federal Communications Act) (overruled on other grounds); Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 151
(challenging constitutionality of a death penalty where defendant waives appeal); Pac. Gas and
249
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that the standing threshold is “especially rigorous” when the court must
decide on the constitutionality of federal government actions.254 But when
threatened injuries are premised on a private party’s negligence, breach-ofcontract, or other common law theory, not implicating any statute or
government action, these concerns arguably abate.
Regardless, some imminent injury is required to satisfy Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement,255 but the courts should apply a lower threshold,
e.g. “substantial” or “reasonable risk,” when the government’s role is de
minimis. The threshold should vary with how much court’s opinion impacts
coordinate branches. This is directly related to the “certainly impending”
threshold, which is intended to minimize the chances that the Court pass
judgments where the injury is not immediate .256 To this extent, consider a
scenario where a private party alleges a federal statute is unconstitutional,
either as-applied or on its face, because the statute will injure the party

Electr. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 198 (1983)
(challenging California nuclear laws as preempted by federal regulation); see also Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 292–94 (1979) (challenging the
constitutionality of an Arizona employment law); Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419
U.S. 102, 121–22 (1974) (challenging the Rail Act). But there are three notable environmental
cases that are exceptions, including Lujan, where the plaintiffs (in those cases) challenged
regulatory interpretations and administrative decisions; yet, the court used slightly different
standards in some of these cases. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007)
(challenging EPA’s non-regulation of greenhouse gases); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 557–59 (1992) (challenging Fish and Wildlife Service’s interpretation of the 1973
Endangered Species Act); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.’ (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 173–74 (2000) (discussing a citizen-suit under the Clean Water Act).
254 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when
reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of
the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional”) (quoting Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)); Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 795–99 (1st Cir. 2014)
(arguing that Clapper makes the standing requirement more rigorous when the courts must
decide whether actions that are taken by the other branches of federal government are
constitutional).
255 See R.S. v. D., 410 U.S. 616, 616–17, n.4 (1991) (noting a longstanding and consistent
requirement that “federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or injury”). But see, e.g.,
Standing and Private Rights, supra note 245, at 279–90 (arguing there is no constitutional basis for
an injury-in-fact requirement and that the injury requirement was first “developed . . . to
expand standing”).
256 In theory, the more time that passes, the less of certainty that injury could occur. See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (describing imminence as the
cornerstone of certainty).
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between twenty-and-thirty years from now.257 If the private party now sues,
the court would need to decide the constitutionality of a statute or
government action for a harm twenty years from now, which reflects the
federal court’s concern for separation of powers.258 In contrast, consider a
private party that sues because she is likely to sustain an injury, because of the
actions (or inactions) of another party at some point, or continuously, over
the next twenty years. In this case, there are far less concerns over the
separation-of-powers doctrine because the court is merely resolving the legal
rights of the parties without a high risk of making constitutional declarations.
2. The Court varies the threshold when considering an injury’s severity
The Court has also varied the standing threshold based on the severity
and types of injuries, effectively making the inquiry context based.259 And the
Court has never explicitly said that the Clapper standing threshold overruled
any of the previous cases.260 For example, the Court has allowed standing
when a plaintiff is at “substantial risk” of coming under the threat of criminal
penalties.261 The Court has also related the severity of harm to the threshold

See, e.g., Addington v. U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 606 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee,
J., dissenting) (arguing that ripeness or an imminent injury “‘coincides squarely with standing’s
injury’ [requirement] [and is] ‘standing on a timeline’” (quoting Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586
F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009)). Bybee’s dissent argued that ripeness turns on whether there
remain any “contingent future events” in the plaintiffs’ theory of injury; and if there are no
further contingencies, and the plaintiff would suffer hardship if judicial review was denied, then
standing should be granted. Addington, 606 F.3d at 1187–88. Thus, in Bybee’s conclusion,
“certainly impending” is about the absence of contingencies, rather than the proximity in time.
Id. This is similar to the “if” test. See infra notes 281–289 and accompanying text.
258 Although there was no constitutional challenge to the Clean Air Act in Massachusetts v. EPA,
Judge Roberts’ dissent addressed these particular facts for a possible injury “by the year 2100.”
549 U.S. 497, 542 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
259 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100–02 (1968) (“[I]n ruling on standing, it is both
appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues”).
260 In fact, the Court still cites previous cases where they applied such exceptions. See Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citing Monsanto and Babbitt as good law).
261 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014); see also supra notes 183–
186 and accompanying text.
257
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inquiry, allowing for a relaxed likelihood when determining whether an injury
is sufficiently imminent.262
Both Babbit and Driehaus were examples where the Court found standing,
even though the threat of harm was not certain or immediate.263 Both cases
involved a plaintiff who faced a risk of criminal prosecution if they continued
their allegedly protected activities.264 In finding standing for both plaintiffs,
the Court did not require that such harm be immediate, only that there was a
reasonable likelihood of enforcement in the future.265 The Court in Driehaus
especially pointed to the risk of criminal prosecution as a basis for providing
standing.266 The Court in Babbitt came to similar conclusions.267
Similarly, the Court has implied that the likelihood inquires varies with
the severity of the injury in Massachusetts v. EPA and Monsanto. For instance,
the Court in Massachusetts v EPA pointed to the “catastrophic” nature of rising
sea levels to justify standing even when the likelihood was “remote.”268
Likewise, the Court in Monsanto noted the “substantial risk” of
“contamination” of “non-genetically-engineered alfalfa,” but did not mandate
that such harms be essentially immediate, a cornerstone of “certainly
impending.”269 In doing so, the Court pointed to “significant environmental

See supra notes 193–195, 215 and accompanying text. Most established risk-management
practices mandate that a potential threat be analyzed from both their severity and probability of
occurrence. Specifically, the risk is a function of both likelihood and severity. See, e.g., DEP’T
OF THE ARMY, TECHNIQUES PUB. ATP 5-19, RISK MANAGEMENT 1–7, Table 1.1 (2014) (noting
that “catastrophic” harms that “seldom” occur are considered to be “high risk”).
263 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2345 (noting that the “threat of future enforcement . . . is
substantial”); supra notes 213–215 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 183–186, 209–217 and accompanying text.
265 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2345–46 (noting the “substantial risk” of enforcement but falling
short of noting that the risk is immediate); Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 300, n.12 (1979) (“Challengers to election procedures often have been left without a
remedy in regard to the most immediate election because the election is too far underway”).
266 See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2346 (“The burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed
by the additional threat of criminal prosecution.”).
267 See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302 (holding that although the criminal provision “may never be
applied,” the Plaintiffs do not need to wait for prosecution to bring their challenge).
268 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007).
269 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–56 (2010) (noting the various
ways farmers would have to react to the possibility of contamination).
262
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concern[s]” emanating from cross-contamination.270 Also, the Court agreed
that the Plaintiffs suffered an injury by expending cost to avoid the
prospective risk of harm, even when they had not yet done so.271
This type of harm was also Reilly’s basis for distinguishing between
identity theft cases with toxic-exposure and defective-medical devices cases.272
However, as discussed previously, many identity-theft victims face more than
just financial losses, they can potentially face life-threatening or harmful issues
when their medical records made inaccurate.273 Depending on the type and
amount of PII stolen, a data-breach victim faces a wide range of potential
injuries, many being health-related.
These cases not only demonstrate the Court’s willingness to make
exceptions on the rigorous “certainly impending” standard, but the Court, in
doing so, illustrates that the constitutional floor for imminent injuries is
something less than “certainly impending.”
B. The “Substantial Risk” Threshold Should Emphasize the Victim’s Relative Risk in
Heightened-Risk Injuries
The Clapper and Driehaus Courts have never described in detail how likely a
harm must be to meet the “substantial risk” threshold. As discussed above,
this is likely because the threshold is sensitive to separation-of-powers
concerns and the severity of harm, which are context-specific. But some
circuit and district courts have quantified the “substantial risk” threshold in
various degrees. However, many such tests do little to account for the
relative risk a victim faces. Specifically, the tests largely ignore the degree the

Id. at 155–56.
See id. at 153–54 (noting that measures farmers would have to take if the injunctions were
lifted, but finding that such measures were injuries).
272 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[S]tanding in medical-device
and toxic-tort cases hinges on human health concerns); see also supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
273 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
270
271

Vol. 7, No. 1

A POST-CLAPPER WORLD

165

victims’ risk-profile changes by the defendant’s actions. They should not.
The “certainly impending” threshold covers the immediacy aspect, ignoring
relative risk. To have any merit as a distinguishable test, the “substantial risk”
threshold must.
1. The “certainly impending” threshold asks whether an injury will
immediately occur, and not whether an injury will occur
Any imminent-injury theory should not require the injury to have already
occurred or is because, otherwise, half of the “actual or imminent”
requirement in Lujan would be meaningless.274 It would also contradict
Clapper’s acknowledgement of a substantial risk threshold.275 For instance,
consider a breach victim alleging a HRIT, with identity theft being the
ultimate injury; if the court forecloses any “possibility of future injury” and
that must be certain to occur, then the probability is, essentially, one. And
given that that the identity theft would be more properly characterized as an
actual injury.276 But many possibilities can become certainties over sufficient
time: “On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone will drop to
zero.”277 Hypothetically, if an event, A, has a one-percent chance of
occurring year-over-year, then, over a long enough period of time, the
probability it will happen is one.278 Similarly, if the same event A has a
See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (“Allegations of possible future injury
do not satisfy . . . Art[icle] III. A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”). Many
courts use Whitmore’s language to compel dismissal of HRIT claims. See, e.g., In re Sci.
Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19, 24
(D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing most claims within the class for lack of ongoing identity theft). But,
again, Whitmore used the “certainly impending” standard in deciding a case involving
government activity. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 151, 158.
275 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150, n.5 (2013)
276 See In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that HRIT was not an injury
under neither the certainly impending nor substantial risk threshold). The Court sought to root
out class members that did not have a previous or ongoing identity theft attempt, but found
actual injuries for members with previous identity theft attempts. Id. at 31–32.
277 CHUCK PALAHNIUK, FIGHT CLUB 17 (1996).
278 As proof: if event, A, has a 0.01 (or one percent) chance of occurring each year, then the
chance that it does not occur in any particular year is 0.99 (or ninety-nine percent). Let n be
274
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heightened risk of a nineteen percent chance of occurring in a year, then the
likelihood (assuming the year-over-year risk is the same) that A would occur
within eight years is eighty percent.279 Consequently, any imminent injury
theory cannot rest its threshold on a simple probability of occurrence; there
should also be a time consideration.280
“Certainly impending” incorporates the time consideration discussed
above and requires that an injury not only have a near certainty of occurring,
but that the certainty occurs immediately.281 In other words, it is not a
question of whether; it is a question of when. And this often expressed by
the “if test” in Reilly and Clapper: if a threatened or imminent injury cannot be
described without using the word “if,” or a series of “ifs,” then the injury is
speculative and too attenuated for Article III standing.282 Thus, the harm
must be essentially “certain” because a party cannot have any conditional
statements attached to the alleged injury.283 In other words, if a plaintiff
requires that a conditional statement be satisfied to show injury, then the
condition becomes an “if” within the “certainly impending” threshold.284
the number of years; as n approaches infinity, the probability (P) that A would not occur is
characterized by P(~A) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚 0.99 $ = 0. In other words, P(A) = 1.
$→&
279 As proof: let P(A) = .19 for any year, then P(~A) = 1-P(A) = 1-0.19 = 0.81 for any year.
Let n be the number of years required for P(A) to approach eighty percent, i.e. where 1 −
𝑃(~𝐴)$ > 0.80. n >

234(5.6)

234(5.78)

= 7.64 years.

Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (noting that “certainly
impending” requires a “high degree of immediacy”).
281 Id.
282 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1157–58 (2013) (demonstrating the
series of “ifs”). Though Reilly cites Storino as a basis for the “if test,” the reasoning likely
formulated from a reading of Whitmore, as it characterized the plaintiffs’ pleading in O’Shea as a
series of if statements. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1990) (“[I]f
respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged . . . they will be
subjected to discriminatory practices” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)));
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d. Cir. 2011) (holding injuries speculative when “one
cannot describe how the [plaintiffs] will be injured without beginning the explanation with the
word ‘if.’” (quoting Storino v. Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2003))).
283 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (rejecting the premise that the
Constitution requires imminent injuries to be “absolutely certain.”).
284 The D.C. Circuit has an alternative way of expressing the “certainty” within “certainly
impending” by holding “future predictions” that “are not normally susceptible of labeling as
‘true’ or ‘false’” as speculative. See United Transp. Union v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
891 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the court “reject[s] as overly speculative those
280
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But even if the Court were to follow its own threshold for imminent
injuries, then the outcome of subsequent cases to Clapper would be different.
For instance, in Driehaus, SBAL could not claim the harm was “certainly
impending” because there is no way it could construe the harm without using
the word “if.” Regardless of how SBAL constructs its theory of injury, it
must condition it on a candidate (or other party) filing a complaint sometime in
the future and on the commission panel finding probable cause; those
conditions transform to “ifs” for the purposes of “certainly impending.”285
Consequently, the Court confers standing in Driehaus case on something less
than “certainly impending.”
Nevertheless, this construction makes sense as a heightened standard if
the Court is concerned about separation-of-powers because it limits the Court
from passing constitutional questions without an immediate injury.
2. Substantial risk tests should emphasize relative-risk injuries
If “certainly impending” occupies the immediate time dimension,286 then
substantial risk theory must turn on some other factor to have any meaning;
and shown previously, it cannot simply be the probability of occurrence.287
One possibility is that the substantial-risk test examines a conditions’ strength
or reasonableness, rather than its existence. For example, the Court in Driehaus
could determine whether the condition “if a candidate files a complaint” is

links which are predictions of future events”). Under the above framework, a condition is
speculative if there is uncertainty – not “true” or false” – in whether it will occur. It then
follows that the “certainly impending” threshold requires an injury to be essentially certain to
happen.
285 Id.
286 See supra note 181.
287 There seems to be a difference. Compare Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 (essentially requiring that
the Plaintiffs produce evidence of monitoring before granting standing) with Monsanto v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55 (2010) (requiring a showing that deregulation
creates a substantial risk for cross-contamination).
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substantially or reasonably likely to occur, all factors considered.288 Similarly,
the Massachusetts v. EPA Court examined whether global warming would be
substantially worsened if the EPA didn’t regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from new vehicles.289 This would be the essence of heightened risk analysis –
deciding whether an event or condition occurring in the future is likely to
occur. But, even so, this runs into the same problems on an expanded
timeline because the condition having a sustained, nonzero likelihood will
certainly happen at some point in the distant future.290 Yet, if the Court binds
substantial-risk theory with an immediacy requirement, there is little
difference to the “certainly impending” threshold. Consequently, the next
logical step would be to examine a condition’s strength or likelihood over a
‘reasonable’ period of time, ‘reasonable’ being more relaxed than
immediate.291 But admittedly, this would raise an additional complexity of
defining a “reasonable time period.”
On the other hand, if the substantial-risk theory examines plaintiffs’ harm
using a time as the indicator, then a distinguishable test emerges. As a
concrete example, consider a victim whose baseline risk of experiencing an
event, E, to be one percent year-over-year. Next, consider that a defendant’s
action causes a sustained ten-fold increase (ten percent year-over-year) to the
victim’s baseline risk of experiencing E. Under the heightened risk, the
victim has nearly an eighty percent chance she will experience E within fifteen

See supra notes 200–208 and accompanying text. The Court held that it standing did not
turn on whether Driehaus would seek reelection because SBAL would discuss other candidates’
seeking reelection sometime in the future. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334,
2344–45 (2014).
289 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–24 (2007) (discussing the effects of global
warming).
290 See supra notes 276–279 and accompanying text.
291 For example, if an event A having a heightened risk of thirty percent per year, it might fail
the certainly impending threshold because it is unlikely to be imminent; on the other hand,
there is more than a seventy-five percent chance A could occur within the next four years,
which may be acceptable under substantial risk. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526
(2007) (granting standing because global warming will have “catastrophic” effects at an
unspecified point in the future); Driehaus, 135 S. Ct. at 2343–45 (granting standing because
SBAL may be charged under the Ohio statute in some future election).
288
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years; however, under her baseline risk, she would not reach an eighty percent
chance of experiencing E until more than 160 years from now.292 In contrast,
a victim with a ten-percent baseline risk of experiencing E, but an elevenpercent heightened risk of E, would only experience a year-and-a-half’s
difference before hitting an eighty percent threshold. Thus, under this
approach, both the underlying risk and the relative increase in risk are
considered over time, but the relative risk impacts are better accounted for.
Also, cases where the harm is conditional on an independent third-party
actor are doomed under the “certainly impending” standard on traceability
grounds.293 However, the “substantial” or “reasonable” risk standard would
allow standing if the strength of the assumption on the third-party actor is
substantial.294 That is, if it is reasonable to assume that a third-party actor,
either through probability or stated intent, then there should be a sufficient
basis for injury-in-fact, especially if the emphasis is on the relative risk. Also,
many security experts argue that finding out where the stolen data came from
is fairly easy for investigators.295

292

N, number of years, is given by N >

234(5.75)
234(89:(;))

, where P(E) is either 0.99 for baseline risk

or 0.90 for heightened risk.
293 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that the injury cannot
result from third-party actions).
294 A good example is the Court’s reasoning in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). In Bennett,
the Court noted that if there are “determinative or coercive” effects on the third-party, then it
can be fairly traceable. Id. at 168–69. But this reasoning presupposes that the third-party actor
will act in accordance with the coercive effect, essentially making the analysis probabilistic. See
id. at 169 (“[W]hile Service’s Biological O[pinion theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’ . . .
in reality it has a powerful coercive effect on the action agency.”).
295 See Krebs on Healthcare, supra note 33 (noting that value is not as easily derived from
healthcare records since they are largely handled by third parties who don’t have a direct
connection to the patients).
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3. Current substantial-risk tests that emphasize overall risk do not do
enough to account for relative risk
The D.C. Circuit has proposed two ways to determine whether an
imminent injury exists: the first way is to treat the “ultimate alleged harm . . .
as the concrete and particularized injury and then … determine whether the
increased risk of such harm [is] sufficiently ‘imminent;’”296 the second is to
treat the heightened risk as an actual injury.297 The second approach is
arguably cleaner because it keeps the courts from having to make difficult,
and sometimes subjective, determinations about which injuries are sufficiently
imminent;298 however, the D.C. Circuit has argued that such an approach also
renders the “actual or imminent” meaningless and opts for the first
approach.299
Given the first approach, several courts have advanced a substantial risk
test. Galaria’s theory that the heightened risk, alone has no significant bearing
on the likelihood of an injury-in-fact and that the proper question is whether
the plaintiff has an overall “substantial risk” of injury.300 The D.C. Circuit
solidifies this reasoning further by requiring that an alleged injury result in “(i)
a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial probability of harm
with that increase taken into account.”301 In other words, not only does the
victim have to show that a defendant’s actions have caused a measurable
See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1297–98
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the approach to characterize heightened risk as an injury and,
instead, presenting an approach using probability-of-harm as the measure).
297 See id. (arguing that if heightened risks were actual injuries, then the imminence requirement
would be meaningless); see also In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2014) (declining to
characterize heightened risk as an actual injury).
298 See Probabilistic Standing, supra note 62, at 75–77 (noting that courts would not need to rely on
“precise calculations of probabilities” if all imminent injuries had standing); see also Winters,
supra note 67, at 365 (arguing the “quantify[ing] risk” mixes “threshold determination[s]” with
“merits analysis”).
299 See Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1297–98 (holding that treating heightened risk as an injury
would lead to standing in every case).
300 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
(distinguishing between relative risk of injury and absolute risk).
301 Public Citizen v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety, 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
296
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increase in the risk of injury, but also that measurable increase has now placed
the victim at substantial risk of injury.
But both tests fail to account for relative risk, especially across time,
which is arguably what the whole issue is.302 As an example, consider a victim
whose baseline risk of developing a particular type of cancer is fifty out of
every 100,000 (0.05 percent), but because of defendant’s actions, his risk is
twenty-five fold (1.25 percent). In terms of time to reach an eighty-percent
risk threshold, the victim moves from 3,218 years to 128 years! The relative
risk is twenty-five times greater, but the overall risk is still less than two
percent, and would likely lead to a rejection of standing by the D.C. Circuit.
Yet, it is unlikely that few societies today would conclude that the victim was
not injured in some way, especially when the result is spread over a class or a
group.303 As a result, the “substantial risk” threshold should rely more heavily
on the relative risk, the first prong of the D.C. Circuit’s test, rather than the
second prong.
III.

APPLYING THE CONTEXT-SPECIFIC THRESHOLD FOR IMMINENT
INJURIES TO DATA-BREACH CASES

In Part II, this Article proposes a framework for a context-specific
standing threshold that varies its likelihood requirement based on separationof-powers concerns and the severity of harm. It also proposes that the

For instance, consider P, whose ordinary chances of suffering an injury are one percent, but
because of D’s actions, P’s chances of injury increase by one percent year over year. Under the
rigorous D.C. test, P would not have standing until one day, perhaps fifty years from now,
which at that point the injury is more likely than not to occur. A concrete example would be
fingerprint data exposure. See David Alexander, 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in U.S. Personnel
Data Hack: Government, REUTERS (Sep. 23, 2015 3:50pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-cybersecurity-fingerprints-idUSKCN0RN1V820150923 (noting OPM’s acknowledgement
that although the technology to exploit fingerprint data is “currently limited,” “the threat could
increase over time”).
303 See Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 96 GEO.
L.J. 391, 411–15 (2009) (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s substantial risk test and arguing that it
fails to account for the population size and an injury’s magnitude).
302
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relaxed “substantial risk” threshold focuses on the increase in relative risk that
the victim suffers from the defendant actions. Given that a data-breach
victim usually sues on a theory of negligence, fraud, breach o
contract, or unjust enrichment,304 separation-of-powers concerns are
minimal, and the courts should be comfortable in applying a lower threshold
of injury.305 Moreover, if the courts were to require apply the “substantial” or
“reasonable” risk standard as a threshold, analyzing the victim’s relative-risk
of harm, then a good balance is drawn between caseload and ensuring the
victim’s get their day in court.306 After all, several companies have settled
after the courts found standing in their respective cases.307
A. Factors to Consider for Substantial Risk Analysis
To determine whether a breach victim alleging a HRIT should have
standing, the courts should begin with identity theft as the ultimate injury;
next, the court should determine how the defendant’s actions have changed
the victim’s risk profile compared to the victim’s baseline risk.308 If the
relative-risk is substantial in that it changes the victim’s risk profile in a
meaningful way, then the court should find standing.309 Most importantly,
when “substantial risk” is applied, the courts should not fixate on whether the
harm will occur within a fixed timeframe; instead, the courts should look at
empirical data and other factors to inform its analysis.

See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part II.A.1.
306 See supra Part II.B.3.
307 See e.g. TARGET BREACH SETTLEMENT, https://targetbreachsettlement.com/ (last updated
Dec. 2015) (notifying victims of a settlement and a chance to file a claim); Anne Bucher, Adobe
to Settle Data Breach Class Action Lawsuit, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/54519-adobe-to-settle-databreach-class-action-lawsuit/ (noting that Adobe has a reached a proposed settlement with databreach victims).
308 See supra Part II.B.3.
309 Supra Part II.B.3.
304
305
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Fortunately (or unfortunately), cybersecurity and protecting sensitive
information (to include PII) have taken a front seat in national politics.310
Consequently, there is increasing data on the effects of identity theft, trends
on cyber intrusion, and on the risks victims often face in these situations.311
Recent trends from Javelin Research suggest that “two-thirds of identity fraud
victims” had previously received a data-breach notice “in the same year.”312
Identity theft has been a sixteen-to-twenty-one billion dollar industry over the
past five years, affecting more than ten million Americans annually.313 In
2014, fourteen percent experienced out-of-pocket losses of $1,000 or more.314
Sadly, many experts conclude that most data breaches were preventable, with
one analysis noting the number to be as high as ninety percent.315
1. Active or Recent Cases of Actual Identity Theft
In analyzing data-breach cases, the courts should consider a combination
of the following factors when determining whether there is a substantial or a
reasonable risk of injury. Generally, the courts do find standing when there
have been previous or ongoing identity thefts.316 It is arguable that most
See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf (discussing various
initiatives for strengthening cybersecurity); DHS, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE
CYBERSPACE 14–15 (2003), https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf)(noting confidentiality as a
priority).
311 DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 3; FINKLEA, supra note 230.
312 Press Release, $16 Billion Stolen from 12.7 Million Identity Fraud Victims in 2014, JAVELIN
STRATEGY & RESEARCH (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/press-release/16billion-stolen-127-million-identity-fraud-victims-2014-according-javelin-strategy.
313 Tamara E. Holmes, Credit Card Fraud and ID Theft Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM (Sep. 16,
2015), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-security-id-theft-fraudstatistics-1276.php.
314 HARRELL, supra note 7, at 6.
315 See SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENHANCING BEST PRACTICES, ONLINE TRUST ALLIANCE 1
(2015), https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/documents/ota2015bestpractices.pdf.
316 See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text; see also In re Target Corp. Customer Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158–59 (D. Minn. 2014) (noting that many of the
Plaintiffs “actually incurred unauthorized charges”).
310
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cases involving some class members who experienced recent or ongoing
identity theft attempts creates a substantial risk of identity theft for all
members.317 But the inquiry should not end there.318 The whole point of
imminent injury standing is that it allows for those injuries that have not yet
occurred.319 Moreover, there are many instances where breach victim are
injured in ways that are not apparently linked.320 Often, this occurs because
companies retain significant amounts of historical, redundant, or excessive
PII, and consumers are unaware that a breach may have affected them.321
More importantly, the substantial risk standard demands more.322 Thus, the
courts should consider additional factors that weigh upon a victim’s relative
risk.

This is not because the probability that any given victim experiencing identity theft directly
influences the probability that any other victim would experience the same thing. But it does
demonstrate both technical competency and intent by the hackers or thieves to utilize the
stolen data for financial crimes or other purposes. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d
38, 43–44 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the attack in Pisciotta).
318 See, e.g, Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.’ Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 854–55 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(applying the “if” test and noting that Plaintiffs cannot have standing until their theory of
injury actually happens); see also In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25–28 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing
only one litigant to proceed because the other litigants had no actual injuries).
319 See supra part II.B.2.
320 For instance, when Anthem Blue Cross disclosed a massive breach, the company and
government officials noted that there was no evidence of identity theft. Rick Jurgens, A Year
Later, Impact of Anthem Data Breach Still Debated, VALLEY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.vnews.com/Archives/2016/02/a1-anthembreach-rj-vn-022116. But the victims
allege that they have had “fake tax returns filed in their names,” along with fraudulent credit
cards and loans in their names. Id. Victims in Storm had also faced fraudulent tax-return issues
near the time of Paytime’s data breach. See Barbara Miller, Paytime Data Breach Could Reach an
Estimated 216,000 in U.S., PENN LIVE (last updated Jun. 8, 2014, 9:24AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/06/paytime_data_breach_reaches_an.ht
ml (noting that the victim had not used Paytime “since 2008” but believes that Paytime
retained his old information). But see Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365–66 (M.D.
Pa. 2015) (noting that none of the class members actually experienced any injury from data
misuse).
321 Nicholas Elliott, Cyber Compliance: Data Excess Magnifies Risk, RISK & COMPLIANCE, WALL ST.
J. (May 14, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/05/14/cybercompliance-data-excess-magnifies-breach-risks/; see Miller, supra note 320.
322 See supra part II.B.
317
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2. Other Factors
Encryption secures data from being accessible by third-parties.323 There
are several industry standards and readily available encryption software,
making this important protection widely implement across multiple industries
today.324 Disk and server encryption greatly lowers potential victims’ risks,
particularly in physical-theft cases where a laptop or hard-disk is stolen.325 If
a stolen laptop or hard-disk has encryption, the hacker must defeat the
encryption to even access the information. On the other hand, anyone could
exploit the information where there is no encryption.326 Surprisingly, many
corporations and agencies fail to follow this basic practice.327 Thus, the
courts should consider whether the data is encrypted in its substantial risk
calculus.
Also, as some courts have hinted that the sophistication of an attack
provides some insight as to the probability that victims of a data-breach will
face a successful identity theft in the future.328 A sophisticated and targeted

See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1206–07 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(noting that the hackers were able to decrypt the personal data in Adobe’s servers); see generally
KAREN SCARFONE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF SCI. & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL
PUB. 800-111, GUIDE TO STORAGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR END USER DEVICES 2-3,
2-4 (2007), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/nist800111.pdf [hereinafter NIST SP800111] (discussing encryption).
324 See NIST SP800-111, supra note 323, at 3-1 (discussing various encryption options such as
disk-based or system-based encryption))).)
325 See Avoid Identity Theft: Protecting Social Security Numbers, U.S. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/phila/ProtectingSSNs.htm (recommending encryption to prevent theft
of social-security numbers).
326 See In re SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that the personal information
on the stolen laptop required specialized hardware and software).
327 See, e.g., Robert Westervelt, Coca-Cola Laptop Breach A Common Failure of Encryption, Security
Basics, CRN (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.crn.com/news/security/240165711/cocacola-laptop-breach-a-common-failure-of-encryption-security-basics.htm; see also Eric Chabrow,
Why Organizations Fail to Encrypt, BANK INFO SECURITY (Dec. 22, 2012),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/encryption-i-1740/op-1; Rick Robinson, The
Impact of a Data Breach Can be Minimized Through Encryption, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21,
2014), https://securityintelligence.com/the-impact-of-a-data-breach-can-be-minimizedthrough-encryption/ (comparing Adobe’s data breach with Target’s data breach and how
encryption would have minimized the cost).
328 See Reilly,F.3d at 44 (recognizing that the attacker in Pisciotta was “sophisticated”); In re Adobe
Sys., 66 F. Supp.3d at 1206–07 (describing a highly sophisticated attack where hackers spent
323
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attack requires time, money, and skill, and there is a higher likelihood that
with the investment of resources, the damage is greater.329 Furthermore, the
more time that passes between the actual attack, the discovery of the attack by
either the victim or the server operators, and the notification to all potential
victims, the more likely that a successful identity theft is possible.330
As previously discussed, attackers sometimes make announcements of a
successful breach and will also state their intentions, sometimes in the form
of a demand.331 The court need not speculate about an attacker’s intentions if
an attacker includes threats of subsequent actions, such the use or disclosure
personal information. Thus, if there is a stated intent, then the courts should
take such intentions as true and analyze whether the victims face a heightened
risk based upon such intentions.
Courts should also consider whether there is any clear evidence that data
was actually stolen. In 2015, there were nearly 80,000 data breach incidents;
however, only a little more than 2,100 had confirmation that data was
stolen.332 It is less likely that victims are at a risk of identity theft if there is no
confirmed report that the exposed personal information was stolen.
Finally, not all data is equal. Some captured information can be used
within a short period of time and only one time. On the other hand, other

weeks breaching Adobe’s servers). Contra Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365–68
(M.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing highly sophisticated attacks as indicative of risk and insisting on an
actual injury prior to standing).
329 See Graeme R. Newman, The Problem of Identity Theft, CENTER FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING (2004), (http://www.popcenter.org/problems/identity_theft/) (distinguishing
between highly organized identity theft operations and opportunistic ones, finding that the
more organized the scheme, the higher chance of success).
330 See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION - IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 8 (2003),
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/identity_theft/PDFs/FTC_2003a.pdf (discussing the
benefits of a “quick discovery” and noting that the amount of time and money a victim needs
to resolve identity theft cases is correlated with the length of time between breach and
discovery).
331 See David Robb, Sony Hack: A Timeline, DEADLINE (Dec. 22, 2014, 1:25 PM),
http://deadline.com/2014/12/sony-hack-timeline-any-pascal-the-interview-north-korea1201325501/ (noting that the hackers in Sony threatened to release personal information,
emails, and other data if Sony did not comply with their demands). The attack on Ashley
Madison also resulted in a ransom letter. Krebs, supra note 18.
332 DBIR 2015, supra note 3, at 3.
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information, such as SSNs, birthdates, and health information have lesser
value when separate, but when aggregated, can create a complete profile of
the victim for future exploitation.333 Such “permanent” PII creates longerterm risk for a victim compared with shorter-term information, such as credit
and debit card numbers. Yet, some studies have shown that stolen credit card
or debit card information is a clear indicator of substantial risk.334
Consequently, the court should consider the amount and type of personal
information that was potentially collected about a given individual or
organization. For instance, healthcare information was the most coveted data
in 2015 because sizable profits could be obtained from insurance fraud.335
Also hackers who obtain large quantities of PII on individuals have multiple
opportunities to exploit that information.336
The relationship between time and the type of information can help
courts considerably. For instance, if debit and credit card numbers were
compromised, as in Zappos, and a few years pass without any substantial
identity theft within the affected class, then there is likely no meaningful
heightened risk.337 On the other hand, when a victim loses control of her
health records, biographical data, and SSN, she may not realize the full effect
of the injury until several years have passed.
All of these factors play into a “substantial risk” analysis. If courts apply
these factors to standing law in data-breach cases, several cases would have
See U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, PROTECTING AGGREGATED DATA 4–6
(2005) (defining data aggregation and discussing the associated inherent risks).
334 See Kathy Kristof, Fraud Risk Soaring for Data Breach Victims, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:27
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fraud-risk-soaring-for-data-breach-victims/ (noting a
study that indicated that, in 2013, “[forty-six] percent of consumers with a breached debit card”
were “fraud victims in the same year”).
335 RECORD BREAKING HEALTHCARE DATA BREACHES IN 2015 MAY BE ECLIPSED IN 2016,
HIPPA JOURNAL (Dec. 10, 2015) http://www.hipaajournal.com/healthcare-data-breaches-in2015-2016-worse-2012/.
336 See, e.g., Peters v. St. Joseph Servs.’ Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 850–51 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(noting that victim’s “[SSN], birthdate, address, medical records and bank account
information” was stolen and that the victim experienced everything from telemarketing for
medical devices to attempted hacks on her Amazon account);
337 See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958 (D. Nev. 2015) (suggesting that three
years without incident may not qualify as an imminent injury).
333
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come out differently. For instance, The Texas branch of St. Joseph Health
Network’s data systems were attacked sometime in December 2013.338 The
hackers had accessed patients’ SSNs, birthdates, medical records, and
financial data.339 St. Joseph discovered the breach and notified potential
victims; the victims sued St. Joseph, arguing they have a HRIT.340 However,
the district court held that the victims lacked standing because a HRIT is not
“certainly impending.”341 And Clapper does not allow mitigation expenses for
‘hypothetical’ injuries.342 But the district court did not apply any meaningful
“substantial risk” analysis.343 Under “substantial risk” the court would have
considered that the substantial amount of permanent PII stolen, which
created the potential for medical and identity fraud. In doing so, the court
would acknowledge the strong possibility that the victims may face serious
injuries in the future stemming from the data breach.
Moreover, the California branch of the St. Joseph Health System recently
settled with data-breach victims in a separate case for twenty-eight million
dollars.344 The settlement stemmed from a mishandled security configuration
in January 2011 that allowed tech-savvy individuals to access a “patient[s’]
names, diagnoses list, medication allergies, body mass index, blood pressure,

David F. Carr, Texas Hospital Discloses Huge Breach, INFORMATION WEEK (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:00
PM), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-and-privacy/texas-hospitaldiscloses-huge-breach-/d/d-id/1113724.
339 Id.
340 Peters, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 850–51.
341 See id. at 854–55 (noting that Plaintiffs’ identity theft injury rests on a series of “ifs”).
342 See id. at 855–56 (acknowledging Clapper’s holding that plaintiffs cannot create standing by
“making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear”) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2015)).
343 Id. at 854–55. Although the district court acknowledges “substantial risk,” it neither applies
a distinct test nor explains why the Plaintiffs do not meet it. See id. at 855 (“The allegation that
risk has been increased does not transform that assertion in to a cognizable injury.”).
344 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, ‘Egregious’ Breach Results in Hefty Settlement, HEALTH INFO
SECURITY (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/egregious-breach-resultsin-hefty-settlement-a-8974.
338
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lab results, smoking status, and advanced directive status,” along with “birth
date, race, and gender.”345
B. Remijas Correctly Applies Standing Law and Substantial Risk Factors When
Considering Data-Breach Risks
In deciding whether the class of victims had standing to bring a lawsuit
against Neiman Marcus under a common-law theory of negligence and other
claims, the Remijas Court concludes that they did using the standards
discussed in Part II.B.1.346 Moreover, the Court distinguished Clapper on its
facts and relaxed the standing requirement to allow a heightened risk of injury
under the substantial risk standard.
The victims sued Neiman Marcus under “state breach laws” and other
common tort claims; they did not allege the unconstitutionality of a statute or
regulation, nor did they challenge government action. Consequently, the
Court considered their injury claims under a relaxed imminent injury
threshold of “substantial” or “reasonable” risk.347
In analyzing the risk, the Court considered three factors: (1) 9,200 of the
350,000 “potentially exposed cards” were already “used fraudulently;” (2)
malware was found in the system that resulted from a fairly sophisticated
attack; (3) and the hack occurred around three to six months before the
discovery. The court also noted that the hack and subsequent downloading
of consumer records created a fair presumption that the hackers intended to
commit fraud. And Neiman Marcus confirmed that data was actually stolen
when it investigated the data breach. Moreover, the type of information
(debit and credit accounts) was the type of information that has value in the

See Howard Anderson, Glitch Exposes Medical Record Online, HEALTHCARE INFO SECURITY
(Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/glitch-exposes-medical-recordsonline-a-4515 (noting that the information was accessible via Internet for nearly a year).
346 See Part I.E.4. and accompanying text.
347 See Part I.E.4. and accompanying text.
345

180

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 7, No. 1

immediacy, so some evidence of existing identity fraud was to be expected.
The Remijas Court understood that there were little separation-of-powers
concerns, as compared to Clapper. And although the main issue in Remijas was
credit-card fraud, the Court correctly applied a substantial risk test to arrive at
standing.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Edith Ramirez, Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman, testified
shortly after the Neiman Marcus breach that “companies continue to make
very fundamental mistakes when it comes to security” and that she did not
“believe the burden should be placed on consumers.”348 Currently the
burden is.349 And the courts should not preclude data-breach victims who
have a realistic and credible potential for identity and medical fraud. The
Remijas Court agreed. And the Remijas acknowledged that Clapper did not
foreclose all data-breach victims from suing corporations who mishandle their
PII.350
Cybersecurity is an emerging area that requires serious attention across all
sectors of industry, government, and the greater society. Cybersecurity is no
less important than physical security, something that many corporations take
seriously. But sound practices are best developed and improved when the
cost and risk allocations are distributed properly across all sectors. They
currently are not. Data breach victims have little recourse and little power in
compelling corporations and agencies to protect their PII, yet it is a priority
(and a concern) for many.

Grant Cross, Target and Neiman Marcus Execs Defend Security Practices, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb.
5, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2487386/cybercrimehacking/target-and-neiman-marcus-execs-defend-security-practices.html.
349 See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
350 See supra Part I.E.4.
348
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Standing law has been a major impediment to data-breach victims.351 But
it does not have to be. This Article argued that Clapper does not compel nonjusticiability in all heightened-risk cases; the separation-of-powers doctrine
does not either. And case-load concerns can be mitigated by applying a
lower, but sensible, substantial-risk threshold that accounts for the relativerisk increase of HRIT that many face. The costs are not trivial; many victims
spend months resolving outstanding financial and credit issues caused by
identity theft.352 To make matters worse, less than three percent of these
victims note that they were saved by credit-monitoring service. Many have
reported becoming distraught; a few have committed suicide.
This Article presented a framework for imminent injuries that can help
give victims the much-needed redress without flooding the courts with a tidal
wave of data-breach litigation. By using an imminent injury framework
sensitive to separation-of-powers doctrine and severity of the injuries, the
courts adhere to Article III principles without needlessly shutting the door for
victims who have little recourse. Additionally, a “substantial risk” threshold
that focuses on relative risk can help in correcting the unbalanced cost-risk
allocation that exists within these situations. In doing so, corporations will
invest more in cybersecurity and embrace current best practices, stemming
the billions of dollars that society incurs yearly.

351
352

See supra Part I.D.
See supra notes 55–60.

